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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(j). This case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to this Court pursuant to 
Notice dated April 27, 2001. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE #1 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN SETTING AS THE VALUATION DATE 
IN THIS EMINENT DOMAIN ACTION THE DATE WHEN JONES AND 
BARKER WERE ALLOWED TO INTERVENE RATHER THAN THE DATE 
SUMMONS WAS SERVED ON THE PROPERTY OWNER, AS MANDATED 
BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-34-11? 
Standard of Review: 
The standard of review for this issue is correction of error in which no deference is 
accorded the trial court because the lower court's ruling was based on its 
interpretation of a statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11, and State Road Commission 
v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), and in response to a Motion for Declaratory 
Judgment. See State v. Montova. 887 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1994). 
ISSUE #2 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING DAVIS COUNTY'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE AND ADMITTING SALES AND DEFENDANTS' EXPERT 
OPINION WHICH WERE ENHANCED AND INCREASED BY THE 
PUBLIC PROJECT FOR WHICH THE PROPERTY WAS CONDEMNED? 
Standard of Review: 
The standard of review for this issue is correction of error because the trial court 
based its ruling on its interpretation of legal precedents. Montoya, 887 P.2d at 858. 
The correction of error standard is applicable because the trial court's ruling was 
based on its interpretation of Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Grutter, 
734 P.2d 434, 427 (Utah 1986) (holding that "in condemnation proceedings any 
enhancement... in value attributable to the purpose for which the property is being 
condemned shall be excluded in determining the fair market value of the property"). 
ISSUE #3 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING DAVIS COUNTY'S MOTION 
IN LIMINE THAT THE JURY NOT BE INFORMED THAT AN ALLEGED 
WEALTHY, PRIVATE, NON-PARTY LAND DEVELOPER WOULD PAY 
THE AMOUNT AWARDED BY THE JURY? 
Standard of Review: 
The standard of review for this issue is correction of error because the trial court 
based its ruling on pretrial briefing and argument. Thus, this Court is in the same 
position as the trial court to consider and decide this issue. State v. 01 sen, 860 P.2d 
332, 335 (Utah 1993). Also, the correction of error standard applies to the trial 
court's selection, interpretation and application of a particular rule of evidence. State 
v. Horton. 848 P.2d 708, 713-14 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied. 857 P.2d 948 
(Utah 1993). 
ISSUE #4 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER, IN 
CONNECTION WITH DAVIS COUNTY'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, AN 
AFFIDAVIT CONCLUSIVELY RESOLVING AN ISSUE WHICH THE 
TRIAL COURT DEEMED DISPOSITIVE IN ESTABLISHING ITS AUGUST 
13, 1998 VALUATION DATE-WHETHER DAVIS COUNTY KNEW OR 
HAD REASON TO KNOW THAT JONES AND BARKER HAD AN 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY AT THE TIME DAVIS COUNTY 
FILED ITS COMPLAINT IN AUGUST 1997? 
Standard of Review: 
The standard of review for this issue is abuse of discretion. See Timm v. 
Dewsnup. 921 P.2d 1381, 1388 (Utah 1996). 
ISSUE #5 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST ACCRUED FROM THE DATE OF ITS FIRST ORDER OF 
IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY, OCTOBER 31, 1997, DESPITE ITS SETTING 
ASIDE THAT ORDER TO ALLOW JONES AND BARKER TO 
CHALLENGE THE PUBLIC NECESSITY OF THIS CONDEMNATION 
ACTION? 
Standard of Review: 
The standard of review for this issue is also the correction of error standard. The 
award of prejudgment interest presents a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
Baillev-Allen Co. v. Kurzet. 876 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
Utah Code Ann. §78-34-11 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9 
State Road Commission v. Friberg. 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Grutter. 734 P.2d 434 (Utah 1986) 
Copies of these authorities are included in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is a condemnation action brought by Davis County to acquire a total parcel of 
14.75 acres of inaccessible wet lands and meadows of the defendant landowners in 
Farmington, Utah, just north of where the 1-15 freeway and State Highway 89 merge. The 
condemnation complaint was filed on August 29, 1997, and summons was served upon the 
owner of record five days later on September 3, 1997. 
The condemned property (the "Kerr Property") was part of the Max Kerr Trust, the 
Trustee being Zions First National Bank. In an October 2, 1997 hearing before the Court 
on Davis County's Motion for Immediate Occupancy, the Trustee acknowledged that it was 
the "real party in interest" in the case, and the Trustee's Answer to the complaint stated as 
fact that it was the only party with any cognizable interest in the Kerr Property. The 
landowner did not contest Davis County's entitlement to condemn and the case was set 
down for trial on the issue of Just Compensation to be measured as of the date of service of 
summons, September 3, 1997, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11. 
Six months later, in April 1998, Jones and Barker moved to intervene in the case 
claiming that it was a contract purchaser in the property in May 1997, and therefore had a 
recognizable interest in the property. The purchase contract obligated Jones and Barker to 
buy only upon certain conditions taking place, which conditions never occurred. However, 
Davis County did not object to the intervention, per se, and the Order of Intervention was 
granted on August 13, 1998. 
Thereafter, on the motion of Jones and Barker, the trial court erroneously changed 
the statutory date of assessment of Just Compensation from September 3, 1997 to August 
13, 1998, the date that the Order of Intervention happened to be signed. Jones and Barker 
wound up stipulating to Davis County's entitlement to condemn and the case went to trial 
using the erroneous valuation date on March 6, 2000. At the trial, the District Judge, over 
the timely objection and motion in limine of Davis County, permitted three sales of other 
properties in the immediate vicinity, whose prices p n a n . had I1 < n Milhlanliall' 'iiJiiiii - -I 
and increased, by tl lie j : m it li : pi c j ^ ::t rtseli '. foi ;l iicl i Dav is C 01 n irty had condemned the Ken 
Property The trial court also erroneously permitted the defendants' expert witness. Cook. 
to predicate his opinio •*•» r i i " • .r^ ( . * <; based upon the alleged comparabk ^ales 
enhanced and increased in v.i.iu n, , .u rh; .;:•< 
P 
During the course of the t r ial the trial judge also erroneously permitted COI.IIMI K> 
argue ///1 v/i //N I.KI inflammatory manner that the source of payment of the condemnation 
awarduiuki Wi. . , > \ e i d i u . \ ! 
c LiIIlely objected that the source of paymeiit of the 
condemnation award was irrelevant and prejudical. 
The jury verdict of $1,606,500.00 was squarely on UIL- i , ok testimonv a-
times the amount wl foi the 
IMp|>"iP ,i in f la I1"11"1 una ui ia^i, Joi ies and Barker had only i nade a refundable 
dow ii payment oi $ l j )nn on en <: • \ ' . 'peity. 
In calculating the interest on ihejudgmei it, the Disti ictCc i n t ei i ed. n igi ai itn lgii ltei est 
• M , J 997, even though the Court 
had changed the statutory date for assessing Just Compensation from September 3, 1997 to 
August , c r V\ en the defendants told the Court that interest couk ui; ;\ n n - • accrue 
on ()ctol)ci _^  I • . . , .. r r. 'S 
i o, i yyh. a W(b to iiu avail - the District Court 
calculated the interest from October 31, 1997 totaling $281,498.30. 
From a denial of Davis County's motion for new trial and application to submit a 
post-verdict affidavit from the Deputy Davis County Attorney, this appeal was taken to this 
Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Condemnation Action, Service of Summons and Initial Order of Immediate 
Occupancy. 
This condemnation action was initiated by Davis County on August 29, 1997, to 
condemn the Kerr Property, 14.75 acres of soggy bottom land. (R. at 1.) Davis County 
named the only entity with a legally cognizable, recorded interest-defendant, Zions First 
National Bank as trustee of the Max Kerr Trust. (R. at 1, 1195 pp. 11-13.) In fact, the 
property was wholly owned by defendant. (R. at 2, 26.) Defendant confirmed to Davis 
County that it was the real party in interest when it "[a]dmitted" in its Answer that it was the 
owner of the Kerr Property and acknowledged at a hearing that it was the "[r]eal party in 
interest." (R. at 2, 26, 1194 p. 69.) Davis County served summons on defendant on 
September 3, 1997, the date statutorily defined as the date on which fair market value and 
just compensation is to be determined. Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11. (R. at 14-16.) 
With its Complaint. Davis County filed a motion for immediate occupancy of the 
Kerr Property. (R. at 10-11.) A hearing on the motion was held on October 21, 1997, and 
defendant raised the issue of Davis County's entitlement to condemn the Kerr Property. (R. 
at 24. 1194 pp. 4, 6.) The trial court, however, found that the condemnation action was 
supported by a valid public use. (R. at 64-66.) On October 31, 1997, the trial court entered 
an order allowing Davis County to occupy the Kerr Property. (R. at 64-66.) 
1
 ! i i,UNIT of the Public Project. 
I),i\P'.«f iiiiiiiiiil, ,ii nil. lit ( i ndi inn Ihr-t in Ptnftnh foi (lii public use of flood control 
us part of a larger Farmington Preserve project, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-/U-2 'F 
at 5.) Davis County, which is statutorily responsible for flood control within its boundaries, 
had been conce™* v. *.;;, , loodmg j . : 
wline I I''1 i in rarmington Cit\
 vk. ai 5-7., bn^L the 
construction of . .:;... ^ ^ : _ .. _ _, .• ken Propert>; and surrounding areas have 
been encumber e i - !*1 wetlands, wrt meadows and periodic Hooding. 
24,40,46. ) .-.. : •• 
sits v ; :)i ii :1 alle v iate tl ne flo roblems. (R. at 5-9.) 
Ai i in tended effect of tl le condemnat ion was .\Uo U- nake w a y for a we t l ands 
mit igation area,, ecological preserve, and a public park wit1 . . . f 1 iese 
improvei r lei its \ > aai: e pai t ai i :1 p am: eel : f a F at i i in igt an: i P i eserve pi p ject, which was 
c ,)n ui iiic interests of various publ ic agencies , including Davis County , Farmington 
Cit\ am! the f v :Jcd Mutes Army Corps of Engineers ("Corp") , and a developei , Prows, 
Beckwell & Alles, I I .C. ("PB \ ' ). 1 1 le v 'etlai ids i i ntigatioi i am: aa ecolc gical pi esei: \ ' e ai id 
pi iblic j: ai k v < ei: z absoh itely essei itial to the development of PBA's lands north of the Kerr 
Property in the Farmington Preserve area ~ \ 1209 Ex. 1 and Ex 2.^ \ mar - r t h e 
Farmington Preserve project area is attached ^ k\iui)i - .vddenaui 
3 . Nature of the Kerr Property. 
i . . . . . . ^oii^ists oi 14.75 acres of vacant land immediately to the north of 
where 1-15 ami State Highway 89 merge in Farmington City As stated above m, Kerr 
Property and surrounding areas have been encumbered with wetlands, wet meadows and 
periodic flooding, particularly the low lying areas closest to the highway. (R at 1194 pp. 
17-24, 40, 46.) Of this area, the Kerr Property was the closest to the highway and was itself 
laden with wetlands on 12-14 of its 14.75 acres. (R. at 1200 p. 160.) A map of the area in 
which the Kerr Properly is situated is attached as Exhibit 2 to the Addendum. (R. at 1209 
Ex.67.) 
The defendants themselves described the Kerr Property as "soupy" and saddled with 
"standing water." (R. at 1200 pp. 4, 7.) Also, defendants' real estate expert reported that 
the Kerr Property was susceptible to flooding: 
The subject and surrounding properties are susceptible to periodic flooding as the line 
under 1-15 is inadequate in size to handle the flows of Spring Creek and Shepherd 
Creek as well as general drainage from areas east of the subject resulting from a 
major flooding event. The water therefore backs up from this culvert and has on 
occasion inundated portions of the subject and surrounding property. 
(R. at 1209 Ex. 73 p. 23.) 
In addition, the Kerr Property had no access for commercial purposes. The Kerr 
Property was physically accessible by only two roads, 1100 West and Burke Lane. (R. at 
1201 pp. 240-41.) Neither of these roads, however, were adequate for commercial 
development of the Kerr Property, as defendants' appraiser himself acknowledged. (R. at 
1209 Ex. 73 p. 24.) 
The Kerr Property had never been developed for any use. Defendants had no 
evidence of plans for commercial or even residential development of the Kerr Property. In 
fact, under federal law, the Kerr Property's wetlands could not be disturbed without a permit 
from the Corp, and tl le Cot p had never iwk ,.. * • .* »i . 
. ) • • 
4. The Interveners, Jones and Barker. 
on \pi- ">>> (ones and Barker t\vr !n~i developers -* motion to 
intervene ' i* ,r ^ - - In 
23, ic rvcn Piopem »x Jones/Barkei Contract"), 
entered into after the announcement of Davis County's commitment to condemn it (R at 
83-9-1 131.926 1200pp.^8 80-81 i?(V*
 r * ' ^ c o ^ ^ . i ^ l ^ -nc , A^A Barker 1 w . 
is attached as Exhibit *M 
I (-- ^ ^unuacL, ilic ino^t Jones and Barker had was a conditional, 
executory contraa to bus the Ken h o p e m TIIL J^nes/Barker Contract contained express 
conditions, two of which never happened I he contract stated: 
1 ntingencies: 
a. [Jones and Baikei j obtaunn- tpproval troin J.I\\ governing authorities . . 
o\er the development ;' :u-- pippem 
c. [Jones and Barker] obtain.;. ' I • Liineers 
to use and develop the sit. 
(R. at 89, 94.) Defendants admitted that "[t]h[e] agreements [between PP A and Davis 
County and Farminetrn Htv] created a contractu; i^tinn ; 
to condtiLi -Mii^r J-UIUL. viL\ciopiiicin v.;_
 4 j . ^ . . i , niijH^ihk1 v'^ - <& 926 
(ei it l p l lasis added).) 
Also, the Jones/Barker Contract required that closing occur "180 days from 
acceptance." (R. at 91.) May 23, 1997 was the date of acceptance. (R. at 93.) Therefore, 
the closing had to occur on or before November 20, 1997. At trial in March 2000, not only 
did defendants represent that there had been no closing on the contract, but they argued and 
presented evidence that "[Davis County] took away Mr. Kerr's ability to sell the property," 
and "[no] actual transactions involving the subject. . . have occurred." (R. at 1200 pp. 78, 
1201 p. 219, 1209 Ex. 73 p. 4 (emphasis added). 
The stated purchase price of the Jones/Barker Contract was $531,000, and Jones and 
Barker made a "earnest money deposit" of only $ 1,000. (R. at 87, 131.) The $1,000 deposit 
was refundable if the stated conditions, such as the ability to develop the property, were not 
met. (R. at 89. 94.) 
Davis County first became aware of the Jones/Barker Contract well after it filed and 
served its Complaint. (R. at 268, 1087, 1205 pp. 7, 11.) At the time it filed its Complaint, 
Davis County believed that Jones and Barker had, at most, an unexercised option to buy the 
Kerr Property that was conditioned on events that could not occur. (R. at 1084-87.) On 
October 21, 1997, intervener Tod B. Jones hand-delivered to Davis County's counsel an 
October 21. 1997 letter signed by Jones and Barker indicating that they had an alleged 
interest in the Kerr Property "by virtue of a real estate contract." (R. at 268, 277, 1087.) The 
exchange occurred on the steps to the courthouse when Davis County's counsel was on his 
way to a hearing on Davis County's motion for immediate occupancy of the Kerr Property. 
(R. at 268, 1087.) After the exchange, both Jones and Barker attended the hearing on Davis 
County's motion. (R. at 1195 p. 4.) 
Despite their awareness of the condei i n latioi i acti- : i i )• : t lies at it :i Bai 1 ;ei v 'ait *• :i i it iti! 
Ape1 ' l | " ll11 inriiiii i' "l ' ' i D J U S ( I'i'i11 ii,ldc ii-» opposition to the 
i notioi i, and Jonc^ and Barker's motioi. u, intervene was granted during a Ji ily 21 1998 
scheduling conference (K a ' ' " 1105 pp ' ' n x The trial court signed an order granting 
the motion to intervene on Augu 
^ i . ^ i i i i , i , . . M -—.»4-_-ti.Mj uj Entitlement to Condemn. 
During the same Jul) 21, 1998 scheduling conference 111 which the cot111 ruled that 
• nes and Barkei tould intervene I^nes and Baiker armied that tlu <Ae\ *>; immediate 
occupancy enteu 1 
h \ 1.) Defendant joined Jones and Barker's position. (R. a. 1:C)5 
p. .., ... _ont:.:_ n •: icndanf^ posiii-M. *.n-:- •> Octobei " 1 , 1997 hearing on Davis 
County's immediate occupancy m,n -i.i\ I\L W was tl le M[i ]eal pai ty ii 111: itei: est " • iefei idai it 
ai gi led tl mat "the pi 11 :1 iiasei: 1  11: 1 dei a :ont 1: act is 1 e alh ' the pai b • 1.1 1 11 itei est 11 1 a condemnation 
suit,' and the first 01 dei of imn lediate occupancy was void because Jones and Barker did not 
participate. (R a H l ° ~ p 1x r v \ovembe? P 1908, the trial court effectively vacated its 
October )!. Il |9 ' otdta ol immediate ni LII|UIIH * 1 h 1 Inut i .nnl H.nl-i uirsl (In puhln 
necessit y c f the : :>i idei 1 1.1: latioi 1. (R. at 197-99.) 
The second hearing on Davis County's entitlement to condemn the Ken P\ opt. rtv was 
held 01 i March S ^ o o n (R at 205-00. » Rathei than contest Davis Countv\ ** • > 
1 
Undei r lab VMUIU W* domain statutes, intervention by those with alleged interests in the 
subject propeity i^  a matUi of riulit 1 y*ah Code Ann § 78-34-7 Jones and Barker's motion 
was, in 1av\ unneces^m 
condemn, however, Jones and Barker stipulated that Davis County's condemnation action 
was based on a valid public purpose. (R. at 237-39.) 
6. Jones and Barker's Motion to Change the Statutory Date for Determining 
Fair Market Value and Just Compensation. 
Days later, Jones and Barker filed a motion to require the court to change the date of 
valuation from the mandatory service of summons date, September 3, 1997, of Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-34-11. (R. at 251.) While Jones and Barker acknowledged that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-34-11 directed that the valuation date "shall be . . . the date of service of summons," 
they urged the trial court to disregard that statute. (R. at 254.) Jones and Barker argued that 
the valuation date should be either March 8, 1999, "the date on which [Davis County's] right 
to condemn the interveners' property was finally established," or August 13, 1998, when the 
order making Jones and Barker parties to this case was signed. (R. at 249.) 
In a bench ruling, the trial court adopted the date Jones and Barker were admitted as 
parties, August 13, 1998, as the valuation date. (R. at 286, 311-12.) The court did not find 
that a departure from the statutory valuation date was necessary to satisfy the requirement 
of just compensation of Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitution. Instead, the trial court 
reasoned that it would be "unfair" to use the September 3, 1997 service of summons date 
"because the interveners were not made a party in September of 1997." (R. at 1198 p. 38.) 
The court also ruled that defendant could take advantage of the August 13, 1998 valuation 
date by merely "consent[ingj" to it. (R. at 1198 pp. 38-39.) 
Motion in Limine on Defendants" Appraisal by J. Phillip Cook and 
Source of Payment of the Condemnation Award. 
I i\ib County filed a motion n i limine regarding the 
admissibility of certain evidence. (R at 373-82, 421-76 ) D.ivis County moved for the 
exclusion of among other things: 
a. evidence oi Ph V \ ,*i ,. h IH1" nl il ' i II,,M I '"Yrsrni pm|r. t aiea; and 
b. evidence that PBA would be the source of payment of the condemnation 
award. 
Davis County \ objection to evidence of PB ^ . drx^opment wa^ ba^ei •. 
valuation, of defendant _i. . , . - ; 
(li/'n'lnpiiiiiil lln1? -: •: " ' ' . '-cnrnroiai. ^k. ai i2Ui pp. 255-59, 264, 2u7., ._ook^ 
appraisal was based ^jiA\ ... ••. uunparable sale> \aluat' ; »r-j ^ it i which the 
appraiser looks to sales of property similar to the subject property to measure uu • i 
property's \ahn < I ?*»l» I \ ' > \\ > i i i I il I Hi v\ ill"- |"><|H" tMt '«.»l' nil which 
( \u)\\\ valuation was based, three of them were PBA sales, and he relied most heavily on 
one of them (R at 1209 Ex. 73 pp. 30-35, 45-46, 1?r* pp. 255-59, 264, 267,,,) The sales 
on which Cook iclinl were: 
a. '.• February —.-. « '. sale of 29.216 acres from PBA to Shepard Creek 
Properties, LLC for $115,501 per acre. 
b. August 3 1 1999 sale of 10.924 acres from PBA to Shepard Creek Properties, 
LI.C for $304,920 per acre. 
c.- February 26, 1997 sale of 25 aci es ft oi i i PB • * tc • PSC Dei ' elopi i lei it Company 
for $92,000 per acre. 
d. August : ' o u salt- oi 4o lH acu-- V *m \f n I short (trustee of the 
Bambergei Family '! HM \ nv 1 asviou loi $95,928 per act e 
e. November 1, 1998 sale of 10.37 acres from WS Hatch Comp., Inc. to 
Kalatham Properties for $108,973 per acre. 
(R. at 1209 Ex. 73 pp. 30-38.) Cook used the per/acre prices at which such parcels sold and 
opined that each acre of the Kerr Property was worth a similar amount. (R. at 1209 Ex. 73 
pp. 45-46, 1201 pp. 264-65.) 
PBA's sales were not the only aspect of the Farmington Preserve project on which 
Cook relied. Cook opined that the highest and best use of the Kerr Properly was high 
density commercial development. (R. at 1201 pp. 275-76.) To overcome the lack of 
commercial access to the Kerr Property, Cook relied on a road constructed as part of the 
Farmington Preserve project, the Shepherd Creek Parkway, which stopped well short of the 
Kerr Property. (R. at 1201 p. 277.) Cook attributed the termination of the parkway to the 
condemnation of the Kerr Property and assumed that but for the condemnation, the parkway 
would have been extended to the Kerr Property. (R. at 1201 pp. 240, 247-48.) 
Due to his reliance on the PBA development, Cook appraised the Kerr Property at 
$ 1,606,500, over three times the $531,000 price set forth in the real estate purchase contract 
defendants entered into barely three months before this action. (R. at 131, 1209 Ex. 73.) 
In support of its motion in limine, Davis County argued that reliance on PBA's 
development in the Farmington Preserve project violated a fundamental tenet of condemned 
property valuation, and one to which Cook even acknowledged. (R. at 375-78.) Cook 
admitted that "[i]t is inappropriate to consider the effect of the intended [condemnation] 
project in establishing market value of a property being condemned." (1209 Ex. 73 p. 23, 
R. at 1201 p. 216.) Cook violated this rule by using as "comparable" sales the three PBA 
sales and by assuming that Shephei J t h i k I'.iikwas \ uiJ I pi \nl unitm n i.tl .u c n ilm 
K ei i Pi < >] \t MI t] /. (R it 1201 ] ] 255-59 26 1 28! 82 286 87 293-94.) 
As stated above, PBAs development in Farmington Preserve project \\ a* a dn .\.\ an*! 
intended result of Davis County's commitment to condemn the Kerr Property m -if 
pp. 360 41)6-43 ; .) Dav is Coin ity s coi idei r n latioi i • : f t l I * I [ :r:t it I *i o p e i t ) • ' • : 
iifA rlnp mi1 ii in, I1- W iiiiiiiiii nil ill i 'i i|i and farmington City would not have allowed PBA 
to develop its lands. (R. at 398, 1200 pp. 128-29, 164-(o 1201 pp. 25^. W * -
Cook admitted this at trial (R a* 1201 pp. 221 :3U ;> -•/•.- ook t i n n e d 
that I . . . j . , • 
"at:w-wii> IL-UIU uic condemnation project
 v^-
 al
 »-Ui pp- 2S9-9U. 300.j l o . k aho 
testified that the arrangement between PBA. Davis County .it ! Farmington City which 
included the condemnation as an integral component, "was what facilitated the sales of those 
[PBA] properties lot :>.> .•• ihiinwi,. :.,2.
 ti. JI v,ic.j . L U I pp. 289-300, 
313-14, 1202 p. 456 (emphasis added).) 
Cook further admitted that "the [Shepherd Creek P]arkway the way it sits today is a 
function of th[e] agreement" n! Km<( oui \ iu o»nilr"'»'< ilh i.cn Pinpnii, ii' I 'in 
p " * "d: 
Q. . . . [W]uii ir m[e] [Master Dc\elopment Agreement], would the Shepherd 
Creek Park\va\ have beei ! : 
A. Probabl l t t ; rurret 
Q. Isn't it ti ue that the parkw ay would not have been built unless that agreement 
were signed9 
A. 1 think that's probably right, the way it's currently configured. 
(R. at 1201 p. 313-14.) 
Defendants admitted throughout this case that PBA's properties within the 
Farmington Preserve were benefitted and enhanced by the condemnation of the Kerr 
Property. (R. at 21, 23-24, 27, 131-32,398-99,431-32, 1195 pp. 4-5, 1196 p. 6, 1199 p. 9, 
1200 pp. 8, 36, 38-41, 1201 pp. 255-57, 319-20, 382, 1202 pp. 455-56, 459, 481-82, 519.) 
Even in connection with Davis County's motion in limine to exclude evidence of the sold 
PBA parcels, defendants admitted that the value of such parcels were enhanced by the 
condemnation of the Kerr Property: 
Each party to the proceeding received something from it. . . . The county gets its 
retention basin. The city gets some trails and some nice green space and an increased 
tax base, which was actively argued to them as a benefit for allowing this project to 
proceed. And [PBA] gets a development and shifts the burden of his wetlands, the 
burden of his drainage onto the Kerr Property. 
(R. at 1199 p. 9 (emphasis added).) Defendants even calculated the amount by which the 
value of PBA's lands were enhanced by the condemnation: 
[PBA] saw the potential in this undeveloped area and tried to acquire it. [It] bought 
up surrounding parcels for amounts between $10,000 and $40,000 an acre. Max 
Kerr, the owner of the subject property, . . . would not sell . . . , so [PBA] came up 
with another plan. . . . [PBA] convinced Davis County to condemn the Kerr Property 
as a flood control basin, thereby placing the entire regulatory burden of his 
development on the Kerr Property. . . . Once [PBA] had an agreement with Davis 
County, he went ahead and sold his property for amounts between $92,000 and 
$304,920 an acre. 
(R. at 431-32 (emphasis added).) By defendants" own admission, Davis County's 
condemnation of the Kerr Property caused PBA's parcels to skyrocket in value, from 
between $10,000 and $40,000 an acre to between $92,000 and $304,920 an acre. 
At trial, defendants continued to argue that the condemnation of the Kerr Property 
enhanced the value of PBA's lands: 
[T]o [have] the development it wanted, [PBA] . . . ma[d]e an arrangement with . . . 
Davis County . . . [in which] all the wetlands on [PBA's] property would be pushed 
down onto Mr. Kerr's. . . . Now what that did was allow [PBA] to build . . . and it 
freed up the ground. Now freeing up the ground allowed a lot of things to go in. . . 
. [T]he City . . . allow[ed] PBA . . . to increase its zon[ing]. So instead of being a 
residential two homes per acre, they've got commercial. 
(R. at 1200 p. 8 (emphasis added); see also R. at 1200 pp. 36, 38-41, 1201 pp. 319-20, 382, 
1202 pp. 481,519.) 
Davis County's motion in limine also sought the exclusion of evidence regarding the 
source of payment of the condemnation award. (R. at 380-81.) Because the condemnation 
of the Kerr Property was necessary for PBA's Farmington Preserve project, the agreements 
between PBA, Davis County and Farmington City dealt with that issue. (R. at 1209 Ex. 2 
pp. 2-3, Ex. 1 p. 18.) Davis County argued that fair market value and just compensation 
does not depend in the slightest on the source of the payment for the condemnation award, 
and it would be irrelevant and highly prejudicial for the jury to be informed that PBA, a non-
party land developer, would ultimately pay the amount awarded. (R. at 380-81.) 
8. Order of Judge Kay Permitting Evidence of Project Related 
Enhancement in Value and the Source of Payment of the Condemnation 
Award. 
In a written order prepared by defendants' counsel, the trial court admitted evidence 
of PBA's development and permitted the introduction of evidence that PBA would pay the 
amount of the condemnation award. (R. at 599.) The trial court definitively "denied" Davis 
County's "motion to exclude evidence that [PBA] is the ultimate source of funding to pay 
for the judgment in this matter." (R. at 599.) 
Later, in connection with Davis County's motion for new trial, the trial court stated 
that the order meant something other than what it said. (R. at 599, 1042-43.) The trial court 
stated that its order "den[ying]M Davis County's motion in limine on the issue of PBA's 
payment of the condemnation award actually meant that it was "deferring]" until trial a 
ruling on that issue. (R. at 1204 p. 87.) The order, however, makes clear that a ruling on 
the issue was not deferred. (R. at 599.) The ruling on the issue a clear and unambiguous 
"denied." (R. at 599.) If the court wanted to defer a ruling on the motion, it could have 
easily stated as much, as it did with respect to other issues which were expressly "deferred" 
until trial. Attached as Exhibit 8 to the Addendum is a true and correct copy of the trial 
court's order. 
9. The Trial Evidence. 
Pursuant to the trial court's rulings on Davis County's motion in liming, evidence of 
PBA's development in the Farmington Preserve project and PBA's payment of the 
condemnation award was admitted at trial. While Cook testified that Davis County's 
agreement to condemn the Kerr Property made possible the three sales of PBA's properties 
and the construction of Shepard Creek Parkway, he rendered his opinion of the fair market 
value of the Kerr Property which heavily relied on PBA's sales and development in the 
Farmington Preserve project area. (R. at 1201 pp. 255-59, 288-90.) In contrast to Cook's 
$1,606,500 appraisal, Davis County's expert, who did not rely on PBA's development, 
opined that the fair market value of the Kerr Property as of the August 13, 1998 valuation 
date was $145,000. (R. at 1201 p. 377.) 
Defendants also presented evidence and remarked at the beginning, middle and end 
of the trial that PBA, a private, non-party, would pay the jury's verdict. (R. at 1004, 1200 
pp. 17, 39, 1201 pp. 379, 1202 pp. 459-60, 482, 517, 1209 Ex. 1, Ex. 2.) For example, 
before any witness took the stand, defense counsel made it a point to interrupt Davis 
County's opening statement to reveal to the jury that PBA was going to pay the amount of 
the verdict. (R. at 1200 p. 17.) 
To make matters worse, the defense portrayed PBA as a wealthy developer which was 
really the entity taking the Kerr Property, and doing so for its own private purposes. (R. at 
1200 pp. 8,36-41, 1201pp. 319-28,379-82,402, 1202 pp. 481, 519.) For example, defense 
counsel had the following exchange with defendants' appraiser: 
Q. Whose wetlands were moved to the Kerr property? 
A. The [PBA] wetlands. 
Q. And is [PBA] a-is the developer a public or a private figure? 
A. He's a private developer. 
Q. Who got a flood detention basin on their property. 
A. Well, Mr. Kerr did. 
Q. Who sold their property for over $9 million? 
A. [PBA] did. 
(R. at 1201 pp. 319-20.) During his closing, defense counsel further argued: 
And I want to ask you, what gives the government the right . . . to take something 
from Max Kerr and give it to someone else? What gives the government the right in 
a for-profit company to take Max Kerr's zoning and everything he had £tnd give it to 
[PBA], to give it to a for-profit corporation? 
(R. at 1202 p. 481.) Defendants argued that "as a way of justice," PBA should be forced to 
pay a significant portion of that $9 million for the Kerr Property. (R. at 1201 p. 392.) 
10. The Jury Verdict. 
The trial court's departure from the valuation date mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-
34-11 and its erroneous admission of the Cook appraisal and evidence and remarks that PBA 
would pay the jury's award prejudiced Davis County, singly and in combination. (R. at 908.) 
As a result of these legal errors, the jury awarded defendants $1,606,500, the exact amount 
of Cook's appraisal and more than three times the $531,000 purchase price defendants 
agreed to shortly before this action. (R. at 908, 950.) 
11. The Trial Court's Erroneous Calculation of Prejudgment Interest. 
The trial court calculated interest on the jury's verdict from the date of the initial 
order of immediate occupancy, October 31, 1997, even though that order was effectively 
vacated when the court allowed Jones and Barker to challenge the public necessity for the 
condemnation action. (R. at 197-99, 949-50.) Defendants urged the trial court to adopt 
October 31, 1997 as the date from which to calculate interest. (R. at 928.) Over Davis 
County's objections, the trial court adopted defendants' position and added $281,498.30 in 
interest to its judgment, calculated from October 31, 1997. (R. at 949-50.) From the bench, 
the trial court reasoned that while the October 31, 1997 order was void as to Jones and 
Barker, it remained in effect as to defendant. (R. at 1203 pp. 7-8.) 
Defendants' argument for an October 31, 1997 interest date lay in stark contrast to 
their earlier position. One of defendants' arguments in support of their motion to change the 
statutory valuation date was that the date from which prejudgment interest would run must 
be March 8, 1999. (R. at 1198 pp. 3-4, 9-10, 34-35, 37.) Defendants apparently believed 
that it would be incongruous for the interest date to precede the valuation date, so they 
argued that either of their proposed valuation dates, March 8, 1999 or August 13, 1998, were 
proper because there would be no possibility for interest to start running before those dates. 
(R. at 1198 p. 3, 9-10, 34-35, 37.) Defendants argued that because "there was no possessory 
act until following the order of immediate occupancy of March of 1999" (R. at 1198 p. 3) 
and "[t]he [first] order of immediate [occupancy]... was void because it lacked jurisdiction" 
(R. at 1198 pp. 9-10, 35), interest could not begin to run until March 8, 1999: 
Given the fact that interest cannot be taxed in this case until the earliest of actual 
possession or the date of occupancy, interest cannot begin to run until March 8th, 
1999. 
(R. at 1198 p. 9.) 
Having achieved an August 13, 1998 valuation date, defendants felt free to take the 
position that the date from which interest should be calculated is the date of the first order 
of immediate occupancy, October 31, 1997. (R. at 928.) 
12. In Connection with Davis County's Motion for New Trial, the Trial 
Court Refused to Consider Evidence Conclusively Establishing the 
Degree of Davis County's Knowledge of Jones and Barker's Alleged 
Interest in the Kerr Property in August 1997. 
On May 12, 2000, Davis County filed a motion for new trial, asserting that three 
errors of law committed by the trial court necessitated a retrial. (R. at 967-70, 972-85.) 
o 1 
Davis County argued that the trial court selected a legally erroneous valuation date, wrongly 
admitted the Cook appraisal and wrongly admitted evidence that PBA would pay the jury's 
verdict. (R. at 967-70, 972-85.) 
Nothing in the record supported the notion that Davis County believed Jones and 
Barker had an interest in the Kerr Property. In fact the Jones/Barker Contract's conditions 
caused Davis County to continually question Jones and Barker's alleged interest in the Kerr 
Property (R. at 113, 167, 267-68, 280-81, 1058-59.) Therefore, before it received the trial 
court*s ruling, Davis County filed an affidavit of its attorney and moved for its 
consideration. (R. at 1084-88.) The affidavit established that at the time it filed its 
complaint, Davis County did not believe that Jones and Barker had a cognizable interest in 
the Kerr Property. (R. at 1195 p. 3, 1198 p. 18.) 
The trial court, however, refused to consider the affidavit. In an order denying Davis 
County's motion for new trial, the trial court also denied Davis County's motion for 
consideration of the affidavit of its attorney. (R. at 1178-79.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This is a matter that should have been a relatively routine condemnation case. 
However, by reason of the conduct of Jones and Barker having nothing to do with the 
inherent market value of the Kerr Property, itself the district court was misled into making 
erroneous and highly prejudicial rulings changing the statutory valuation date, permitting 
sales and expert evidence based on enhanced values resulting from the public project for 
which the subject property was condemned, and permitting Jones and Barker's counsel to 
engage in inflammatory comment and argument that the condemnation award ultimately was 
going to be paid not by Davis County, the condemnor, but by a well-to-do real estate 
developer. The result was an impassioned jury verdict that was ten times in excess of the 
fair market value of the land based on comparable sales that were not enhanced or 
influenced by the project itself and over 300% higher than Jones and Barker had 
conditionally agreed to pay under their executory, non-binding contract. 
To begin with, this case began as thousands of condemnation cases in Utah do 
with the filing of the complaint, on August 29, 1997, and service of summons and complaint 
upon the record owner in possession of the Kerr Property on September 3, 1997. The Ken-
Trustee appeared in the action as the "real party in interest" and an order of immediate 
occupancy of the condemned property was entered on October 31, 1997, with Jones and 
Barker being present in the court room during the hearing. 
Six months later, on April 17, 1998, Jones and Barker filed a motion to intervene, 
claiming a contract interest in the condemned property. They could have appeared, pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-7 at any time since the proceeding is in rem\ the statute gives any 
such claimant an unconditional right to appear, plead and defend "in respect of his own 
property or interest, or that claimed by him, in the same manner as if named in the 
complaint." Jones and Barker's alleged contract interest was executory, conditional and 
unenforceable in every way. The purported agreement was dated May 23, 1997, the stated 
purchase price was $531,000.00, and the "earnest money deposit" was the grand sum of 
$1,000.00, refundable if precisely stated conditions, such as obtaining approval from 
government authorities for development of the property and from the Corp of Engineers, 
were not met and satisfied. Under the agreement, the conditions were required to be met 
within "180 days from acceptance" i.e., November 20, 1997. Jones and Barker knew of the 
existence of the condemnation case in August 1997 and as well, equally knew that their 
development of the Kerr Property was impossible as of the date of service of summons, as 
well as the date of occupancy by Davis County. Notwithstanding that fact, Jones and 
Barker's subsequent motion to intervene of April 17, 1998, was granted on August 13, 1998. 
Jones and Barker thereafter engaged in a neat little shell game, first claiming that the 
property7 was theirs, then claiming before the jury that it was that of Max Kerr and then back 
again. They moved to have the date of valuation altered from the statutory date of 
September 3, 1997 to a manufactured date that the district judge happened to sign the order 
of intervention on August 13, 1998. The trial court granted the motion finding that it would 
be "unfair" to Jones and Barker if the fair market value and compensation for the 
condemned property were to be established at a value date prior to their intervention. 
Although Jones and Barker asked that the order of immediate occupancy of October 31, 
1997 be set aside so that they could contest the entitlement of Davis County to condemn the 
Kerr Property, they later stipulated without objection to the right to condemn and the case 
proceeded to trial in March 2000 using a manipulated valuation date of August 31, 1998. 
Only one other case in eminent domain in the entire history of Utah2 had proceeded to trial 
on compensation and damages using a date other than the date which the Legislature has 
declared and established under § 78-34-11. 
2 
State Road Commission v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984), a case that is distinguished 
absolutely from and inapposite to the instant case. 
At trial, the trial judge allowed in evidence as alleged comparable sales three separate 
property transactions whose value were clearly and admittedly enhanced by the public 
project for which Davis County had condemned the Kerr Property. The trial court's ruling 
was clear error. The trial court in Utah acts as a "gatekeeper" in determining, as a matter of 
law, whether a sale meets the basic test of the willing and informed buyer and seller in the 
open market without the sale having been enhanced or influenced by the public project 
which caused the government to condemn the owner's property. The case law both from 
the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court holds that it is reversible error 
to admit such inflammatory sales or evidence. 
But the issue does not stop there. The trial judge also permitted Jones and Barker's 
only expert witness, J. Philip Cook, to testify as to an enhanced value of the property, 
squarely predicating his opinion upon the three enhanced sales from the project, itself. 
Without the use of those sales' transactions, Cook's appraisal would have been without 
foundation and his value of $1,606,500 would have been less than half that sum. As it 
turned out, using the enhanced sales, Cook's appraisal was more than three times the 
executory purchase price of $531,000 which Jones and Barker had agreed to on May 23, 
1997, barely three months before the correct date of valuation of September 3, 1997. 
The admissibility of the enhanced sales and the Cook appraisal was prejudicial error 
on the part of the trial court requiring a reversal and that the case be sentt back for new trial 
on the issues of compensation and damages. 
The trial court also permitted, over objection of Davis County, Jones and Barker's 
counsel to refer repeatedly to the fact and present evidence that the condemnation award 
returned by the jury was to be paid by PBA and not by Davis County. The case law in Utah 
and throughout the United States prohibits evidence before the trier of fact as to the source 
of the proceeds to be used to satisfy and pay the judgment. That is the law whether it is a 
case in eminent domain or one involving an insured defendant. In Utah, trial courts have 
consistently refused to permit evidence, argument or comment in a freeway condemnation 
case that the federal government, not the taxpayers of Utah, will pay approximately 92% of 
a condemnation award because the freeway is a federal-aid highway project. In the case at 
Bar, the jury was apprised that another property owner and developer, PBA, who was 
assisting Davis County in the Farmington Preserve, would pay for the condemnation of the 
Kerr Property as part of the larger project. Such argument and comment was inflammatory 
and highly prejudicial to Davis County and, without any reasonable doubt, highly influenced 
the exorbitant jury verdict. For the trial court to have permitted such comment and argument 
was prejudicial error. 
In calculating the interest to be due on the condemnation award, the district court 
engaged in an extraordinary miscalculation of prejudgment interest that gave to the 
defendants a "windfall" interest of $281,498.30. The trial judge effectively vacated its first 
order of immediate occupancy, and Davis County's entitlement to occupy the Kerr Property 
was not established until March 8, 1999 (when Jones and Barker stipulated to the 
entitlement to condemn and occupancy). Under the statutory scheme of § 78-34-9, interest 
on a condemnation award can run from the date of occupancy. In this case, this was March 
8, 1999. 
Even defendants saw the obvious legal difficulty of calculating the interest on the 
judgment from a date prior to the date of valuation, for they argued before the trial court that 
there was really no possibility of interest running from a date earlier than August 13, 1998 
or possibly March 8, 1999. Yet the trial judge, over the strong objection of Davis County, 
engaged in a unique miscalculation of prejudgment interest starting on October 31,1997 on 
a condemnation award, the valuation and market value data of which was nearly 11 months 
later, August 13, 1998 and an altered occupancy date of March 8, 1999. 
This bewildering calculation of interest was prejudicial error of the clearest type and 
must be reversed as part of the remittitur of this case for a new trial. 
Lastly, in connection with Davis County's motion for new trial, the trial judge in 
defense of his position on altering the valuation date, raised, sua sponte, the question 
whether the Deputy Davis County Attorney actually knew of the interest of Jones and Barker 
at the time the condemnation complaint was served on September 3, 1997. In response to 
that query, while the motion for new trial was pending, Davis County filed an Affidavit of 
Gerald E. Hess to establish indisputably, that Davis County was not aware of any vested or 
cognizable interest that Jones and Barker had in the condemned property at the time of 
service of summons. In ruling on and denying Davis County's motion for new trial, the trial 
judge refused to even consider said Affidavit of Mr. Hess, an officer of the Court. That was 
prejudicial error that compounded the alteration by the trial court of the valuation date. 
The rulings of the trial judge in this case were unmistakably erroneous, inflammatory 
and highly prejudicial and resulted in an astonishing verdict of $ 1,606,500.00. That verdict 
only could have been a product of the erroneous rulings of the trial court as set forth 
hereinabove. A new trial is mandated, it is respectfully submitted. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL ERROR WHEN IT 
CHANGED THE STATUTORY VALUATION DATE BY MOVING IT 
FORWARD NEARLY TWELVE MONTHS. 
1. Statute 78-34-11 and Case Precedent Require That Fair Market Value Be 
Determined as of the Service of Summons Date. 
If there is one issue that is understood absolutely by every experienced eminent 
domain lawyer and jurist in this State, it is that in determining fair market value and Just 
Compensation in a condemnation case, the Legislature has statutorily declared that the date 
of valuation is the day upon which summons was served upon the primary landowner. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-34-11 states unequivocally: 
78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued. 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto 
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its 
actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property 
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, 
but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as 
provided in Section 78-34-10. 
In the thousands upon ten thousands of eminent domain cases brought in Utah over the last 
120 years, the Courts have with a single exception (to be discussed infra), insisted and 
mandated that 78-34-11 was the date, and the only date upon which compensation and 
damages in eminent domain was to be established. As stated by the Supreme Court in State 
Road ComirTn v. Bettilyon's Inc., 405 P.2d 420,422 (Utah 1965): 
"This court has held that under those statues [the eminent domain code] the 
measure of compensation or damages is the actual value of the land on the 
date the summons is served or the land actually taken." 
Id. at 422. In 1960, the Supreme Court stated the rule in State Road Common v. Valentine, 
349 P.2d 321, 322-23 (Utah 1960): 
"[The] well-established principle^ governing fair market value [is that such 
value is] assessable at the time suit was commenced." (emphasis in original). 
Id. 322-23. The legal policy behind this Legislative edict is that the date of service of 
summons is not only the time in which the court obtains in rem jurisdiction over the land and 
in personam jurisdiction over the owner of the land, but it is also the time in which the 
condemnor must definitively plan to pay compensation and damages for the condemnation 
acquisition. It sets the time, as well, for the landowner so that he may not enhance his 
damages while the condemnation suit is pending. Valentine at 322; Utah Dept. of Transp. 
v. Walter M. Ogden and Sons, Inc.. 805 P.2d 173, 175 (Utah 1990) ("[T]he condemnor is 
entitled to a degree of certainty regarding the taking, including the date upon which 
compensation must assessed. This is the policy behind section 78-34-11, which deems the 
date of valuation to be the date of service of summons."); Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1974). 
In the instant case, the date that the trustee of the Kerr Property, Zions First National 
Bank, was served with summons was September 3, 1997. That is the date that should have 
been used in the case. Zions filed an Answer to the summons and complaint and 
acknowledged that it was the "real party in interest." The fact that an additional interest such 
as lessee, sub-lessee, contract purchaser, assignee, mortgagee, tax authority, or other interest 
may thereafter intervene in the case claiming entitlement to the compensation and damages 
to be paid, does not alter the Legislative declaration of § 78-34-11. 
In this case, the trial judge treated § 78-34-11 as though it were some discretionary 
recommendation which could be disregarded if it appeared "unfair." The lower court 
thereupon permitted Jones and Barker to lead it astray by adopting the date that these 
conditional contract buyers were permitted to intervene as parties, viz., August 13, 1998. 
That date was a sheer coincidence for it just happened to be the date in which the trial judge 
signed the Order of Intervention. The date in which Jones and Barker submitted themselves 
to the jurisdiction of the court was at least six months earlier, i.e. in April, 1998. 
The difficulty with placing the eminent domain date of valuation in a discretional 
float is that it not only destroys the certainty of the law for both condemnor and the 
landowner, but it allows the landowner, aided by a trial judge, to manipulate the date of 
valuation for the landowner's benefit. That manipulation resulted in an extraordinary 
enhancement by at least fifteen (15%) percent in the compensation to which Jones and 
Barker ultimately received under the jury verdict. Prejudicial error was committed by the 
trial court. 
2. The Decision in State Road Commission v. Friberg Is Totally Inapposite 
and It Was Prejudicial Error for the District Court to Rely Upon It. 
The singular decision in over a century of jurisprudence in Utah holding that the 
valuation date in eminent domain should be other than the date of service of summons as 
prescribed in Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11 is State Road Comm. v. Friberg, 687 P.2d 821 
(Utah 1984). The district court prejudicially erred in relying upon Friberg stating that Jones 
and Barker were denied due process rights by Davis County's failure to name or serve them 
as conditional contract buyers of the Kerr Property. 
There are two fundamental reasons why the Friberg exception to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-34-11 is applicable. First, Friberg was an extremely unique case in which the State 
Road Commission (now UDOT) commenced condemnation proceedings in 1972 to acquire 
the artist's property in southeast Salt Lake County for the construction of 1-215. Due to the 
State's failure to satisfy certain environmental issues involving 1-215, itself, it was not 
known until late 1979, over 7 years after the Fribergs were served with summons, that 
UDOT would actually proceed with the freeway project. It was acknowledged that during 
the 7 years delay, caused by UDOT, "there had been a substantial increase in the value of 
the Fribergs' land." 687 P.2d at 835. The Fribergs argued that under the specific exigencies 
of a 7 year time lapse, they would be deprived of just compensation in violation of Article 
I, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution if compensation was to be established as of 1972. The 
Supreme Court, under the narrow facts presented, agreed and the valuation date was 
established as of the time when UDOT's right to condemn the Fribergs' property was finally 
established in 1979. Id. at 835. 
In its opinion the Friberg court stated that in every case, the "presumption" for setting 
the date of valuation would be that of § 78-34-11 and a "high standard" would be required 
to rebut that presumption: 
To rebut that presumption, the unfairness of valuing property as of that date must be 
evident and the difference in value must not be insignificant. In the vast majority of 
cases, the date of service of summons will be the appropriate date for determining 
valuation, and no judicial time need be expended in determining whether another date 
would be more advantageous to one party or the other to some small degree. 
id at 831 -32 (emphasis added). In the case at Bar, the trial court found that the application 
of the service of summons date would be unfair solely because Jones and Barker were not 
parties at the time summons was served on September 3, 1997. The court's ruling had 
nothing whatsoever to due with the Friberg rationale where the market availability and 
market value of the Friberg property was frozen for 7 years while UDOT litigated the 
environmental aspects of 1-215 with other interests in federal court. The trial court did not 
begin to find that use of the statutory valuation date in this case would result in unjust 
compensation to the landowners. Even though lessees, partners and other similar interests 
often enter a condemnation case after the date of service of summons of the record owner 
and real party in interest, such late interventions do not entitle the interveners to an updated 
valuation date. When the trial court determined that it would be "unfair" to Jones and 
Barker to apply the September 3, 1997 date of service of summons and adjusted that date 
to the date in which the trial judge happened to sign the order of intervention on August 13, 
1998, such ruling not only violated the statutory mandate of § 78-34-11, it violated the 
rationale of Friberg. 
The second fundamental basis of the trial court's error was its determination that 
Jones and Barker had due process rights which were violated by Davis County's failure to 
name or serve them as having an interest in the Kerr Property. No authority was cited to 
support the proposition that a conditional contract buyer has a due process right to be a party 
to the condemnation action on the date of service of summons on the contract sellers. The 
Legislative decision cannot be ignored by such an argument. Utah Department of Transp. 
v. Walter M. Ogden and Sons, Inc., 805 P.2d 173, 175(Utah 1990) ("the condemnor is 
entitled to a degree of certainty regarding the taking, including the date upon which 
compensation must be assessed. This is the policy behind § 78-34-11 which deems the date 
of valuation to be the date of service of summons."); Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake 
City v. Mitsui Investment Inc., 522 P.2d 1370, 1372 (Utah 1974). 
Jones and Barker did not have an interest in the Kerr Property that required Davis 
County to name or serve them in the condemnation complaint. All they had was a 
contingent, conditional interest in a potential, unconsummated real estate purchase contract 
that expired by its terms before they even became interveners in the case. Jones and Barker 
had no right to possession, no legal title, and no recorded interest of any type, contract or 
otherwise. One of the conditions to the Jones and Barker purchase of the Kerr Property was 
approval by a governing authority of "commercial development." That condition could 
never possibly be met. A potential unexercised option was the most that Davis County 
believed that Jones and Barker possessed. The defendants, themselves, argued that the 
agreements between Davis County, Farmington City, and PBA created a contractual 
obligation on the part of Davis County to condemn the Kerr Property "which made 
development of the property impossible." (R. at 926) The defendants further presented 
evidence at trial that "on the date fixed for valuation, Mr. Kerr was holding [the property]," 
"[Davis County] took away Mr. Kerr's ability to sell the property," Mr. Kerr "couldn't close 
[on the contract with Jones and Barker] because of the condemnation" and "no actual 
transactions involving the subject [property] have occurred." (R. at 1200, pp. 75, 78, 1201 
p. 219, 1202 p. 485, Cook Appraisal (Ex. 73 at 4)) What is clear in all of the evidence is 
that Jones and Barker had, at the utmost, an executory contract to purchase based on 
conditions which never took place. Davis County clearly was not required to name Jones 
and Barker in its complaint. The executory contract was not of record, no sale price had in 
fact been paid, and a possession of the property remained with the owner, the Kerr Trust. 
In State Road Comm. v. Valentine, 349 P.2d 321 (Utah 1960), a similar interest was 
found non-compensable by the Supreme Court of Utah. In Valentine, the lessee of the 
property under condemnation intervened in the action to claim damages for the unexpired 
term of its lease with the property owner. The Court regarded such interest as "non-
compensable" because at the time of the hearing on the State's motion for immediate 
occupancy, the lessee only had an "executory contract for a lease": 
At the time of hearing on motion for immediate occupancy, the instrument titled a 
"lease" was nothing more than an executory contract for a lease, as yet unenforceable 
as a lease, and hence non-compensable. 
Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added). The facts with Jones and Barker are parallel to Valentine. 
There had been no closing on the Jones/Barker Contract, and because of the failure of the 
conditions under the executory agreement, it was not an enforceable contract as an 
instrument of conveyance. Thus, Jones and Barker's alleged interest was not relevant in this 
eminent domain action. 
Even if Jones and Barker had a legitimate interest in the Kerr Property, their due 
process rights were not violated. It is well established that in eminent domain cases, 
"[p]ersonal notice is not an indispensable element of due process. It is sufficient if the 
notice is of such a nature that it will probably apprise the owners of the proceedings. . . . 
These principles stem from the unique character of a condemnation proceeding as one that 
is in rem." 1A Nichols on Eminent Domain § 4.103[2] (Rev. 3rd ed. 2000); Dohanv v. 
Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369(1930) ("The due process clause does not guarantee to the citizen 
of a state any particular form or method of a state procedure. . . . Its requirements are 
satisfied if he has reasonable notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present 
his claim or defense."). 
In this case, the Jones and Barker had actual notice of Davis County's action to 
condemn the Kerr Property, even before summons was served on the owner. In fact both 
Jones and Barker were present at the October 21, 1997 hearing on Davis County's motion 
for immediate occupancy of the Kerr Property. (R. at 1195 p. 4.) "When it is shown that 
an owner has actual knowledge of the taking, although he has not received formal notice, 
courts will not be vigilant to protect his rights if he fails to appear at the hearing." Id. at § 
4.103[3]; Town of Middleburg v. Steinmanor, 458 A.2d 393 (Conn. 1983). 
Again, State Road Commission v. Valentine is controlling. There, the state had 
instituted that case only against the fee owners of the property being condemned. It had not 
included the company, Western Refining, which had entered into a lease for such property 
after being "informed that a highway was going through the area." 349 P.2d at 321. At a 
hearing on the government's motion for immediate occupancy, representatives of Western 
Refining, one of which was a fee owner of the property and the other purporting to be his 
attorney, were in attendance. Later, Western Refining joined the action to claim damages 
for the unexpired term of its lease. The Utah Supreme Court held that by failing to disclose 
its interest at the hearing on immediate occupancy, Western Refining was "estopped" to 
pursue its claim: 
If [the individuals in attendance] as [officers] of Western Refining intended to assert 
any claim for damages for interference by the State with a ten-year lease, a full 
disclosure of such intention should have been made at the hearing on the motion for 
immediate occupancy. It is no answer, under the facts of this case, to say Western 
Refining was not a party to the litigation at that time. By their silence they and the 
company in which they were the two top officials were estopped because of non-
disclosure. We believe it inconceivable that the trial court at said hearing would have 
entered the conditional order it did . . . had the court known that before him were two 
officials of a company that... later would attempt to claim damages for an unexpired 
term of an unrecorded "lease" that, at the time of commencement of this action, 
virtually was worthless. 
Id. at 322 (emphasis added). Likewise, in this case Jones and Barker were in attendance at 
the October 21,1997 hearing on Davis County's motion for immediate occupancy. Neither 
these individuals nor the Kerr defendant indicated that Jones and Barker would seek to assert 
their claimed interest in the action. To the contrary, Kerr defendant adduced evidence that 
Max Kerr was the "[r]eal party in interest." (R. at 1194 p. 69.) At the very least, this Court 
should view with intense incredulity Jones and Barker's claim that Davis County's failure 
to include them deprived them of due process. 
3. The Erroneous Valuation Date Prejudiced Davis County in Nearly All 
Aspects of this Condemnation Action. 
Because an erroneous valuation date was used, defendants' expert took the various 
sales prices of what he believed to be comparable sales and then inflated those prices at the 
rate of one percent per month which substantially increased his valuation of the condemned 
property. In addition, three of the five allegedly comparable sales defendants' appraiser 
relied on occurred well after the September 3, 1997 service of summons date. Had the 
service of summons date been applied, it would have been even more clear that they were 
not comparable to the Kerr Property. At the very least, their sale prices would have had to 
have been discounted to account for the appreciation in value over time. 
The trial court's unprecedented decision to select the date alleged interest holders 
were admitted in the action as the valuation date was erroneous and prejudicial. Therefore, 
this Court should reverse the trial court's order setting August 13, 1998 as the valuation 
date; establish the service of summons date, September 3, 1997, as the valuation date for 
this case in accord with Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-11; and remand for a new trial. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE COOK 
APPRAISAL WHICH RELIED ON THE PROJECT FOR WHICH THE KERR 
PROPERTY WAS CONDEMNED. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly held that any enhancement in value attributable 
to the condemnation is not admissible to determine the fair market value of property in 
eminent domain proceeds: 
"We hold that in condemnation proceedings any enhancement . . . in value 
attributable to the purpose for which the property is being condemned shall be 
excluded in determining the fair market value of the property." 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Grutten 734 P.2d 434, 437 (Utah 1986). This 
rule is grounded in good sense. "If a distinct tract is condemned, in whole or in part, other 
lands in the neighborhood may increase in market value due to the proximity of the public 
improvement erected on the land taken." United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 376(1943). 
It would be absurd and unfair to the condemnor to value the property to be condemned as 
if it were adjacent thereto and a beneficiary of the condemnation. See Friberg, 687 P.2d at 
830 n.8 ("A publicly announced general plan of area-wide condemnation may have the 
effect of artificially increasing the value of properties not initially included in the area to be 
condemned, thereby resulting in a windfall to the landowner."). 
For example, in Grutter, the court upheld the exclusion of evidence offered by the 
landowner of the value-enhancing aspects of the development adjacent to the condemned 
property because that development was dependent on the condemnation. 734 P.2d at 435, 
437. In United States v. Miller, the Court cited the following example: 
[In] Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, . . . Congress . . . authorized 
commissioners to establish a park along Rock Creek in the District of Columbia, and, 
for that purpose, to select not exceeding two thousand acres of land. In 1891 the 
commissioners prepared a map of the lands to be acquired, which was approved by 
the President as required by statute. Proceedings were brought to condemn certain 
tracts lying within the mapped area. The Supreme Court of the District instructed . 
. . the triers of fact that they "shall receive no evidence tending to prove the prices 
actually paid on sales of property similar to that included in said park, and so situated 
as to adjoin it or be within its immediate vicinity, when such sales have taken place 
since the passage of the act . . . authorizing said park . . ." The instruction was 
approved by this court. 
3 17 U.S. at 377-78. 
In this case, defendants' sole valuation expert repeatedly violated the anti-
enhancement rule to arrive at his $1.6 million appraisal. First, Cook selected as three of his 
five "comparable" sales PBA's sales of parcels directly benefitted by the condemnation 
action. Cook testified that these tracts were the most comparable to the Kerr Property and 
gave their sales greater weight than the other two. Moreover, Cook refused to adjust the sale 
prices downward to account for the benefits realized from use of the nearby Kerr Property 
as a flood control basin, recreational open space, ecological preserve and for walking trails. 
Indeed, Cook apparently ignored the fact that the condemnation of the Kerr Property and the 
development which hinged on that condemnation had increased the value of the PBA lands 
sold by over 450%. While PBA acquired the tracts for approximately $2 million, the 
subsequent development, of which the condemnation was an integral part, enabled PBA to 
sell the same lands for over $9 million. Defendants represented that two of the parcels Cook 
relied on appreciated in value from between $10,000 and $40,000 an acre to between 
$92,000 and $304,920 an acre "[o]nce [PBA] had an agreement with Davis County" for the 
condemnation of the Kerr Property. (R. at 431-32.) 
Courts uniformly find that evidence of such sales is inadmissible because it 
unrealistically distorts the value of the properly under consideration. For example, the Utah 
Supreme Court in Grutter upheld the exclusion of evidence offered by the landowner of the 
value-enhancing aspects of the development adjacent to the condemned property because 
that development was dependent on the condemnation. 734 P.2d at 435, 437. 
In Board of County Commissioners of Eagle County v. Vail Associates, Ltd., 468 
P.2d 842 (Colo. 1970)(en banc), the condemnor sought to condemn a strip of land for an 
interstate highway, and the trial court permitted the condemnee's expert to value the strip 
by reference to a sale of an adjacent parcel which closed after the highway project had been 
announced. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the trial court committed prejudicial 
error, necessitating a new trial: 
We agree that this sale included an enhancement of land value as a direct result of the 
highway improvement and, therefore, it becomes dissimilar for comparison purposes. 
A landowner is not entitled to recover an increase or enhancement in value of his 
land caused by the proposed improvement for which his land is being taken. Nor 
should a landowner be entitled to indirectly increase the value of his land being taken 
by comparing it with a sale of other land the value of which has been enhanced by 
the public improvement contemplated. 
Id. at 847 (citation omitted)(emphasis added); see also Latham Holding Co. v. State, 209 
N.E.2d 542, 544 (N.Y. 1965) (overturning verdict and remanding for a new trial because 
evidence of a sale of allegedly comparable land was admitted where the land had appreciated 
in value as a result of the improvement for which the condemnation action was commenced); 
State Highway Common v. Lacev, 113 N.W.2d50, 51-52 (S.D. 1962) ("Where the sale price 
[of the alleged comparable land] reflects an important enhancement of value because of the 
building of the interstate highway [for which the condemnation action is brought], the sale 
is clearly not admissible."). Cook's reliance on sales of PBA's lands which had appreciated 
in value as a direct result of the purpose for the condemnation action was improper, and 
should have been excluded. 
The other way in which Cook inflated his appraisal with the value-enhancing effects 
of the condemnation of the Kerr Property is with respect to access. Cook opined that the 
highest and best use of the Kerr Property was intensive commercial development. However, 
Cook admitted that without the extension to the Kerr Property of Shepherd Creek Parkway, 
which was constructed as part of PBA's development the Kerr Property would be 
completely cut off from commercial traffic and hence unsuitable for commercial 
development. To overcome this problem, Cook assumed that the parkway would have been 
extended but for the condemnation of the Kerr Property. 
What Cook refused to take into account however, is that but for the condemnation 
of the Kerr Property for a flood control basin. Shepherd Creek Parkway would not have been 
created in the first place. Cook even admitted that without the condemnation of the Kerr 
Property, the parkway would not have been constructed in its current configuration. Thus, 
by assuming that the parkway could provide commercial access to the Kerr Property. Cook 
improperly considered the effects of the condemnation action. For these reasons, a new trial 
should be ordered. 
The admission of the Cook appraisal greatly prejudiced Davis County. Three out of 
the five sales on which Cook relied were sales of PBA's tracts in the Farmington Preserve 
project, and Cook gave such sales primary weight. Also, had the Shepard Creek Parkway 
not been built, Cook would have had no basis to opine that intensive commercial 
development was the highest and best use of the Kerr Property. Clearly, reliance on PBA's 
development in the Farmington Preserve was what Cook used to justify his staggering 
$1,606,500 appraisal, which the jury obviously adopted. 
The Cook appraisal violated the holding of Grutter and should have been excluded 
by the trial court. The trial court's refusal to do so prejudiced Davis County. For these 
reasons, Davis County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's order 
admitting the Cook appraisal into evidence and remand the case for a new trial. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN ADMITTING 
INFLAMMATORY AND IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE THAT PBA WILL PAY THE 
AMOUNT OF THE CONDEMNATION AWARD. 
It is well settled that the source of payment in a condemnation action is irrelevant and, 
if other than the condemnor, prejudicial: 
'That the expenses incident to condemnation and the award itself are to be 
paid by private parties is immaterial when the property thus being acquired . 
. . is to be used for a public benefit, and . . . it [is] highly prejudicial for 
members of the jury to be informed that someone other than the condemning 
party would have to pay the verdict." 
Nicrosi v. City of Montgomery, 406 So. 2d 951, 952-53 (Ala. Ct. App. 1981); see Southern 
Elec. Generating Co. v. Leibacher, 110 So. 2d 308, 313-14 (Ala. 1959). 
The Utah Supreme Court expressed agreement with this rule. In State Road 
Commission v. Woollev, 15 Utah 2d 248, 390 P.2d 860 (1964), the court noted that: 
"[:]a juror did not already know" that an entity other than the condemnor 
would pay the condemnation award, it would be unfairly prejudicial to 
"suggest that [the entity] would pay for the property being taken and therefore, 
perhaps, tried to make such juror more generous in his award than if he 
believed the State would be solely responsible for payment." 
Id. at 862. 
The Utah Supreme Court also has "recognize[d] the potentially prejudicial effect 
information of a defendant's wealth can have in a jury trial. As one scholar noted, c[R]ich 
men do not fare well before juries, and the more emphasis placed on their riches, the less 
well they fare."' Ong Int'l (U.S.A.I Inc. v. 11th Avenue Corp., 850 P.2d 447, 456 (Utah 
1993)(citing Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1191 
(193 1)); see also Deiavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 993 P.2d 222, 225 (Utah Ct. App. 
1999) ("[Ejvidence of a party's wealth or financial condition is inadmissible until a finding 
of liability for punitive damages has been made. This rule is intended to prevent juries from 
being improperly influenced by a party's wealth in assessing compensatory 
damages-damages which should be assessed based solely on losses, not the losing party's 
ability to pay"). Where a jury was exposed to information that a defendant was a wealthy 
foreign corporation, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the defendant was not accorded a 
fair trial and that the issues should be submitted to another jury." Anderson v. Santa Fe Trail 
Transp. Co., 107 Utah 20, 151 P.2d 465, 467 (1944). 
In this case, the jury was repeatedly told by defense counsel that PBA will pay the 
condemnation award. With reference to multi-million dollar land sales and without concern 
for the capital and effort expended to develop the land, defense counsel also portrayed PBA 
as a wealthy non-party. 
In this context PBA's position is no different than a liability insurer providing 
coverage for a defendant in a personal injury case. Just as it would be error to admit 
evidence of liability insurance in the personal injury case, it was error for the trial court in 
this case to admit evidence of PBA's indemnification of Davis County. Hill v. Cloward, 14 
Utah 2d 55, 377 P.2d 186, 187 (1962) ("It seems hardly necessary to state that the matter of 
insurance is quite immaterial to issues as to liability and damages, or the amount thereof"). 
The admission of this evidence "affected the outcome of the proceedings." Verde, 
770 P.2d at 120; State v. Knight 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987); Beldan v. Dalbo. Inc.. 752 
P.2d 1317, 1319, 1321 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Utah R. Evid. 103(a); Utah R. Civ. P. 61. 
With the admission of this evidence, the jury was left to conclude that it could be free with 
the money of a wealthy non-party. The evidence that a private party will pay the award may 
also have induced the jury to believe that there was no public necessity for the 
condemnation, contrary to the stipulation that there was a public necessity for it, and to 
award what they believed to be the amount defendants would accept for a private sale of the 
Kerr Property, the $1.6 million they requested. 
In denying Davis County's motion for new trial the trial court suggested that Davis 
County waived its objection to this evidence by not objecting to it at trial. Davis County, 
however, had no opportunity to object at trial before the jury was first exposed to the 
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. Defense counsel interrupted Davis County's opening 
statement to inform the jury that "[Davis County is] not paying for this property, the 
developer is." (R. at 1200 p. 17.) 
Moreover, Davis County adequately preserved its objection in a motion in limine 
which, in a written order prepared by defendants' counsel, was definitively "denied." (R. 
at 599.) "[W]hen an issue is argued before the court and the court makes a definitive ruling, 
as is the case here, the issue is adequately preserved." Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 806 P.2d 
235, 237 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (citing State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Mitchell, 779 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1989); State v. Griffin, 754 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)). 
"[T]o require an additional objection at trial following a pretrial motion to suppress, simply 
to preserve the issue for appeal would be absurd," and "where legitimate trial strategy 
dictates that [the] party opposing admission of evidence loses [its] pre-trial motion and then 
proffers the evidence at trial, [its] objection is preserved." Id (citing American Home Assur. 
Co. v. Sunshine Supermarket Inc., 753 F.2d 321 (3rd Cir. 1985); United States v. Cook, 608 
F.2d 1175, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978)). 
Davis County had no obligation to proceed as if the trial court's order did not exist and call 
the jury's attention to and thereby emphasize such evidence by renewing its objection. 
The trial court, however, suggested that its written order definitively "den[ying]" 
Davis County's motion meant that it was "deferring" a ruling on the issue until trial. The 
trial court pointed to oral statements it made during the hearing on Davis County's motion 
to support its position. 
Utah law is clear, however, that regardless of the language used during the hearing, 
the language of the final written order controls. Evans v. State, 963 P.2d 177 (Utah 1998); 
Matter of Estate of Leone, 860 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (written orders are subject 
to the same rules as written contracts). The trial court's written order clearly "denied'' Davis 
County's motion to exclude evidence of PBA's indemnification of Davis County. 
Importantly, if the court wanted to defer a ruling on the motion, it could have easily stated 
as much, as it did with respect to other issues which were expressly "deferred" until trial. 
Also, the trial court's oral statements during the hearing indicated, at least to counsel 
for defendants who prepared the written order, that trial court was not deferring a ruling 
until trial. Defendants' counsel were likely influenced by the trial court's statements that 
"I'm not going to say that [evidence of PBA's indemnification of Davis County is] going 
to be excluded, that they can't do it" and that "I'm not allowing them to exclude that [PBA] 
has nothing to do with this." (R. at 1199 pp. 60-61.) Whether influenced by these or some 
other statements of the court, defendants' counsel obviously believed, as did Davis County, 
that the trial had definitively "denied" Davis County's objection. He prepared the order 
expressly and unequivocally stating as much. 
Evidence of PBA's payment of the condemnation award was improper and 
prejudicial to Davis County. Davis County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court's order admitting such evidence and remand the case for a new trial in which such 
inflammatory evidence is excluded. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED BY SELECTING A LEGALLY 
ERRONEOUS DATE FROM WHICH TO CALCULATE PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST. 
The prejudgment interest date is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-9, which states 
that the judgment in a condemnation action "shall include, as part of the compensation 
awarded, interest . . . from the date of taking actual possession thereof by the plaintiff or 
order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment." 
In this case, the trial court calculated prejudgment interest from the date of the first 
order of immediate occupancy, October 31, 1997. This was incorrect because the trial court 
effectively struck this order to allow Jones and Barker to challenge Davis County's right to 
occupancy. Even defendants' counsel recognized that the first order of immediate 
occupancy was "void." (R. at 1198 pp. 9-10, 35.) 
The date from which interest is calculated should have been March 8, 1999, the date 
of the stipulation entitling Davis County to immediate occupancy. As defendants argued to 
the trial court, this was "the date on which [Davis County's] right to condemn the [defendant 
and] interveners' property was finally established." (R. at 249.) Also, Davis County did not 
take possession of the Kerr Property until after March 8, 1999. Defendants admitted this as 
well: "there was no possessory act until following the order of immediate occupancy of 
March of 1999." (R. at 1198 p. 3.) Thus, as defendants themselves argued to the trial court, 
"Given the fact that interest cannot be taxed in this case until the earliest of actual possession 
or the date of occupancy, interest cannot begin to run until March 8th, 1999." (R. at 1198 
p. 9.) Davis County respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling 
establishing October 31, 1997 as the date from which interest will be calculated. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT PREJUDICIALLY ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
CONSIDER AN AFFIDAVIT CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHING DAVIS 
COUNTY'S KNOWLEDGE OF JONES AND BARKER'S INTEREST IN THE 
KERR PROPERTY AT THE TIME DAVIS COUNTY FILED ITS 
COMPLAINT. 
The trial court erred in refusing to consider the affidavit offered by Davis County to 
explain the degree of its knowledge of Jones and Barker's alleged interest in the Kerr 
Property at the time the action was initiated. The trial court's selection of an August 13, 
1998 valuation date was based in large part on its assumption that Davis County believed 
that Jones and Barker had a legitimate ownership interest in the Kerr Property. There was 
no basis for that assumption, and, in fact, Davis County had continually questioned whether 
Jones and Barker had any cognizable interest in the Kerr Property. Moreover, the trial court 
refused to consider Davis County's affidavit setting forth its understanding of Jones and 
Barker's alleged interest. Thus, the trial court assumed without any basis that Davis County 
believed Jones and Barker had an ownership interest in the Kerr Property and then refused 
to allow Davis County an opportunity to set the record straight. In this way, the trial court 
acted arbitrarily and capriciously. 
CONCLUSION 
There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from the manifest error committed 
in this case. Davis County was plainly denied a fair trial in the condemnation of the Kerr 
Property. 
The trial court permitted and then participated in a manipulation and rigging of the 
valuation date and the comparable market data and opinion evidence based upon enhanced 
values generated by the project for which the Kerr Property was condemned. When added 
to the inflammatory comments about the source of payment of the condemnation award, the 
result was a jury verdict unsupported by competent and admissible evidence and based upon 
a valuation date altered from that which the Legislature, itself, has declared. 
The miscalculation of interest is but an added facet to a judgment that cannot be 
permitted, in the manifest interest of justice, to stand. 
The judgment of the trial court must be reversed and set aside and a new trial ordered 
and mandated, it is most 
Respectfully submitted, 
^ &L*£ji^> * \&>. 
ROBERT S. CAMPBI 
Van Cott Bagley Cornwall & McCarthy 
Special Deputy Davis County Attorney 
CHRIS R. HOGLE 
Berman Gaufin Tomsic Savage & Campbell 
Special Deputy Davis County Attorney 
GERALD E. HESS 
Davis County Attorney's Office 
Dated: June 6, 2001. 
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 REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
lis i$ a legally binding contract Utah law requires n»al estate llc«nsees to us» this form. Buyer and Seller, however, may agree to alter or 
llet8 its provisions or to use a different form. If you desire legal or tax advice, consult your attorney or tax advisor 
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
low and h&reby,delivers to the brokerage, as Earnest Money, 
uyer /tft* H K ^ ^ c ** JftOL g .JZ^CfJkJS. offers to purchase the Property 
ascribed bel ^by, li B the amount of $ /'/frtZs? in the form of 
4&rtrf£**^r c"A - which, upon Acceptance of this offer by all parties (as defined in Section 23). shall be 
eposired in accordance with state law 
eceived by: 
Phone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 
. PROPERTY: &€*& <<S //<?&> < v /^s^s^y^c*- *Ss 
Iso described a>fc* / ^ / r ^ ^ ^ fey 7 ^ / ^ S 
)ity of jiZ^j^xy X. . County of JO</>**•*>>. , State of Utah (the "Property"). 
Included Items. Unless excluded herein, this sale includes the following items if presently attached to the Property 
lumbing. heating, air conditioning fixtures and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light fixtures and bulbs 
athroom fixtures; curtains, draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows: window blinds; awnings 
istalled television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and 
iccompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also be included in this sale and conveyed 
mder separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: 
1.2 
1.3 
Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this sale: 
Water Rights. The following water rights are included in this sale: 
J?s+**<-
jtSsu-^r 
1.4 Survey. A survey map of the Property certified by a licensed surveyor [ ] WILL [ X WILL NOT be prepared. The 
Property comers [ ] WILL Jp^WlLL NOT be marked by survey stakes set by a licensed surveyor or engineering company. The 
:ost of the applicable items chetked above will be: [ ] paid by Buyer [ ] paid by Seller [ ] shared equally by Buyer and 
Seller [ ] Other (specify) 
For additional terms, see attached Survey Addendum if applicable. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. The Purchase Price for the Property is $ _ 
2.1 Method of PaymenL The Purchase Price will be paid as follows: 
/£*€%? (a) Earnest Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described In this Contract, THIS DEPOSIT 
y ^ MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE. 
_ _ (b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to apply for a new loan as provided in Section 2.3 Buyer will apply for 
one or more of the following loans: [ ] CONVENTIONAL [ ] FHA [ J VA 
I ] OTHER (specify) 
If an FHAA/A loan applies, see attached FHA/VA Loan Addendum. 
If the loan is to include any particular terms, then check below and give details: 
t ] SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS _ 
$ (c) Loan Assumption (see attached Assumption Addendum if applicable) 
$ ty$rp 7S1ZS (d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable) 
$ (e) Other (specify) 
pS, £C7J (f) Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Settlement 
* ^3(f &&*> PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through (f) 
Tagc I I h p.igci Seller's Initials '(AA ^ Date *> ^J\ - ^ 1 Buyer's Initials^ 
-A 
2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box) 
(a) [ J Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for the applicable loan(s) 
referenced in Section 2.1(b) or (c) (the "Loan"). This condition is referred to as the "Financing Condition ' 
(b) [ ] Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan Section 2 3 
does not apply. 
2.3 Application for Loan. 
(a) Buyer's duties. No later than the Application Deadline referenced in Section 24(a), Buyer shall apply for the Loan. 
"Loan Application"occurs only when Buyer has: (i) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender (the "Lender") the 
initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender; and (ii) paid all loan application fees as required by 
the Lender. Buyer agrees to diligently'work to obtain the Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with any 
additional documentation as required by the Lender. 
(b) Procedure if Loan Application is denied. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that the Lender does not 
approve the Loan (a "Loan Denial4), Buyer shall, no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a copy to Seller. 
Buyer or Seller may, within three calendar days after Se!ler=s receipt of such notice, cancel this Contract by providing 
written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.3(b): (i) if the Loan Denial was 
received by Buyer on or before the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline referenced in Section 24(d). the Earnest 
Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer: (ii) if the Loan Denial was received by Buyer after the Earnest Money 
Forfeiture Deadline. Buyer agrees to forfeit, and Seller agrees to accept as Seller's exclusive remedy, the Earnest 
Money as liquidated damages. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the 
Financing Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section of this 
Contract shall be governed by such other provisions. 
2.4 Appraisal of Property. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property [ ] IS £ t f IS NOT conditioned upon the Property 
appraising for not less than the Purchase Price. If the appraisal condition applies and tnfe Property appraises for (ess than the 
Purchase Pnce. Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no later than three calendar days!after Buyer's 
receipt of notice of the appraised value. In the event of such cancellation, the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer, 
regardless of whether such cancellation is before or after the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline. A failure to cancel as provided in 
this Section 2.4 shall be deemed a waiver of the appraisal condition by Buyer. 
SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING. Settlement shall take place on or before the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 
24(e). ASettlement" shall occur only when all of the following have been completed: (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and 
delivered to each other or to the escrow/closing office all documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow 
instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under these documents (except for the proceeds of 
any new loan) have been delivered by Buyer to Seller or to the escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds; and 
(c) any monies required to be paid by Seller under these documents have been delivered by Seller to Buyer or to the 
escrow/closing office in the form of collected or cleared funds. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the fee charged by 
the escrow/closing office for its services in the settlement/closing process. Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and 
interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated at Settlement as set forth in this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not 
limited to. security deposits, cleaning deposits and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at Settlement. 
Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(e). unless otherwise 
agreed to in writing by the parties. Such writing could include the settlement statement The transaction will be considered closed 
when Settlement has been completed, and when all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have 
been delivered by the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/closing office; and (ii) the applicable Closing documents have been 
recorded in the office of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (i) and (ii) of the preceding sentence shall be 
completed within four calendar days of Settlement 
4. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within^J/G .Arbours [ ] days after Closing; 
[ ] Other (specify) 
S. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract: 
[
 r / ^ l ] Seller's Initials [ 1 Buyer's Initials, 
The Listing Agent. / ^ ^ A ^ L ^ ^ S ^ ^ - i ^ ^ ^ represents [ ] SellerJ>LBuyer M , both Buyer and Seller 
Selling Agent. 
~ ~ I ~ > 7 / O as a Limited Agent; 
y ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ A T representor^Seller [ ] Buyer j > $ both Buyer and Seller 
S ' ^ «-- ZP^ " aa a Limited Aaent* as a i ite  ge t; 
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A 
ie Listing Broker. _ firf S^sfjj? £ , represents [ ] S e l l e r p ' ^ u y e r ^ ^ b o t h Buyer and Seller 
y 7 rff^ a s a Limited Agent; 
, Selling Broker, &n S*»A ^ W " ? , representy^Seller [ ] Buyepf^both Buyer and Seller 
^^ as a Limited Agent; 
TITLE INSURANCE. At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance insuring 
uyer in the amount of the Purchase Price 
SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b). Seller shall provide to 
uyer the following documents which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures": 
0 a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller; 
)) a commitment for the policy of title insurance; 
:) a copy of any leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing; 
J) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building or zoning code 
violations; and 
5) Other (specify) 
. BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's obligation to purchase under this 
;ontract (check applicable boxes): 
»^JS [ ] IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7; 
] IS £>4J£ NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a physical condition inspection of the Property; 
>4JS [ ] IS NOT auditioned upon Buyers approval of the following tests and evaluations of the Property: (specify) 
any of the above items are checked in the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4 apply; otherwise, they do not apply. The 
ems checked in the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the "Evaluations & Inspections." Unless otherwise provided in 
vs Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be paid for by Buyer and shall be conducted by individuals or entities of Buyer's 
hoice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the walk-through inspection under Section 11. 
8.1 Period for Completion and Review of Evaluations and Inspections. No later than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline 
jrenced in Section 24(c) Buyer shall: (a) complete all Evaluations & inspections; and (b) determine if the Evaluations & 
inspections are acceptable to Buyer. 
8.2 Right to Cancel or Object. If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable, Buyer may. no 
ater than the Buyer Cancellation Deadline, either: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller, whereupon the 
Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections. 
8.3 Failure to Respond. If by the expiration of the Buyer Cancellation Deadline. Buyer does not: (a) cancel this Contract 
as provided in Section 8.2; or (b) deliver a written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & Inspections, the Evaluations & 
nspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer. 
8.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shall have seven calendar days 
after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period*') in which to agree in writing upon the manner of resolving 
3uyefs objections. Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyers objections. If Buyer and Seller have not agreed in 
anting upon the manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no 
ater than three calendar days after expiration of the Response Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to 
Buyer, regardless of whether such cancellation is before or after the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline. If this Contract is not 
:anceled by Buyer under this Section 8.4. Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those 
items warranted in Section 10. 
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS. There N ^ A R E [ ] ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there are. 
the terms of the following addenda are incorporated into this Contract by this reference: £ ^ A d d e n d u m No. /
 m 
[ ] Survey Addendum K d Seller Financing Addendum [ ] FHA/VA Loan Addendum [ ] Assumption Addendum 
[ ] Lead-Based Paint Addendum (in some transactions this addendum is required by law) 
[ ] Other (specify) . 
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10. SELLER WARRANTIES & REPRESENTATIONS. 
10.1 Condition of Title. Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property and will convey good and marketable title 
Buyer at Closing by general warranty deed, unless the sale is being made pursuant to a real estate contract which provides for 
.e to pass at a later date, in that case, title will be conveyed in accordance with the provisions of that contract. Buyer agrees, 
however, to accept title to the Property subject to the following matters of record: easements, deed restrictions. CC&R's (meaning 
covenants, conditions and restrictions), and rights-of-way; and subject to the contents of the Commitment for Title Insurance as 
agreed to by Buyer under Section 8 Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existing leases affecting the Property and 
not expiring prior to Closing. Buyer agrees to be responsible for taxes, assessments, homeowners association dues, utilities, and 
other services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any loan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1(c). 
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, judgments, mechanic's liens, tax liens and warrants. Seller 
will cause to be paid current by Closing all assessments and homeowners association dues. 
10.2 Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the following condition ON THE DATE SELLER 
OELIVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER: 
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-related 
damage to the Property shall be repaired at Seller's expense: 
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing and sprinkler systems and fixtures, and the appliances and fireplaces will be 
in working order and fit for their intended purposes; 
(c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller; 
(d) any pnvate well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits, and shall be in working order and fit 
for its intended purpose; and 
(e) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be in the same general condition as they were on the 
date of Acceptance. 
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION. Before Settlement. Buyer may. upon reasonable notice and at a reasonable time, conduct 
a "walk-through" inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is -as represented," meaning thfat the items 
referenced in Sections 1 1. 8.4 and 10.2 ("the items") are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed, and in tfee warranted 
condition. If the items are not as represented. Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace, correct or repair the items or, with the 
consent of Buyer (and Lender if applicable), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the same. The failure to conduct a 
Ik-through inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of the right to receive, 
, the date of possession, the items as represented. 
12. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that from the date of Acceptance until the date of Closing, none of the 
following shall occur without the prior written consent of Buyer (a) no changes in any existing leases shall be made; (b) no new 
leases shall be entered into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be made or undertaken; and (d) no 
further financial encumbrances to the Property shall be made. 
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, limited liability company, or other 
entity, the person executing this Contract on its behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer and Seller. 
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT. This Contract together with its addenda, any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosures, constitutes 
the entire Contract between the parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, 
understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by written agreement of the parties. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract 
[ J SHALL fcd MAY (upon mutual agreement of the parties) first be submitted to mediation. If the parties agree to mediation, the 
dispute shall be submitted to mediation through a mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to 
bear its own costs of mediation. If mediation fails, the other procedures and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. 
Nothing in this Section 15 shall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending mediation. 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect either to retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or to return 
it and sue Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Seller defaults. In addition to 
return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit as 
liquidated damages, or may sue Seller to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue other remedies available at law. If Buyer 
elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. It is agreed that denial 
^ a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a default and is governed by Section 2.3(b). 
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17. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS. 
17.1 In Actions to Enforce this Contract. In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract, the 
mailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. Attorney fees shall not be awarded for participation in 
mediation under Section 15. 
17.2 In Interpleader Actions. If a principal broker holding the Earnest Money Deposit ts required by law to file an 
interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over that Deposit, Buyer and Seller authorize that principal broker to draw from that 
Deposit an amount necessary to advance the court costs needed to bring that interpleader action. The amount of the Deposit 
remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court. Buyer and Seller further agree that whichever of them is 
found to be in default may be ordered to pay any reasonable attorney fees, or additional court costs, incurred by the principal 
broker in bringing the action, unless the court finds that there was fault on the part of the principal broker or his or her agent that 
would make such an award of attorney fees and costs unjust. 
18. NOTICES. Except as provided in Section 23, all notices required under this Contract must be: (a) in writing; (b) signed by the 
party giving notice; and (c) received by the other party or the other party's agent no later than the applicable date referenced in this 
Contract 
19. ABROGATION. Except for the provisions of Sections 15 and 17.1 and express warranties made in this Contract, the 
provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss to the Property not caused by Seller or Buyer, including physical damage or destruction to the 
Property or its improvements due to any cause except ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking in eminent domain, shall 
be borne by Seller until Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be 
agreed to in writing by all parties. Unless otherwise explicitly stated in this Contract: (a) performance under each Section of this 
Contract which references a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and!(o) the term 
*daysH shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the timing 
^uirement (j
 e Acceptance, receipt of the Seller Disclosures, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shall not be 
ding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed to in writing 
oy such non-party. 
22. FAX TRANSMISSION AND COUNTERPARTS. Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract, any addenda 
and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original. This Contract and any 
addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts. 
23. ACCEPTANCE. "Acceptance" occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the 
offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other party's agent that 
the offer or counteroffer has been signed as required. 
24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Buyer and Seller agree that the following deadlines shall apply to this Contract: 
(a) Application Deadline No later than i£> calendar days after Acceptance. 
(b) Seller Disclosure Deadline No later than ££> calendar days after Acceptance. 
(c) Buyer Cancellation Deadline No later than Jt^L calendar days after Buyer's receipt of all of the 
Seller Disclosures. 
(d) Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline afj2^calendar days after the^Buyer Cancellation Deadline. 
(e) Settlement Deadline fSO &£** / > * ^ /L»>Zr x (DATE) 
25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on the above terms ana conditio 
does not accept this offer by: / - \ J AM JpQ PM Mountain Time ^ f s ^ *?~12 ffi . 1 9 ^ 2 _ 
shall lapse; spd the Brpkerage shall returrUhe Earnest Money Depict toJJuysr. J * / 
(Buyer's S i g n a l ) (Offer Date) 
The later of th« above Offer Dates shall be reftrrtd to aa the "Offer Reference Date" 
.uyers* Names) (PLEASE PRINT) (Notice Address) (Phone) 
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3 ^cLLER FINANCING ADDENDUM 
.ton® JQ M-°'^n 
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
. rilS SELLER FINANCING ADDENDUM is made a part of that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with 
an Offer Reference Date of ¥~Af . 19 ^ 7 between 72^/'ff***^ / ^2**>/ /Z*r£**s 
as Buyer, and /7?A< /fvfV ^^ (/ ^ /
 a s Seller, regarding the 
Property located at fr*~g / V //&-& Cj /&**?£~ /¥.££&&& The terms of this ADDENDUM are hereby 
incorporated as part of the REPC. 
1. CREDIT DOCUMENTS. Seller's extension of credit to Buyer shall be evidenced by: [ *1 Note and Deed of Trust 
[ ] Note and All-inclusive Deed of Trust [ f Other: 
CREDIT TERMS. The terms of the credit documents referred to in Section 1 above are as follows: 
prinp$al amount of the note (the "Note"); interest at & % per annum; payable at approximately S 
^ yV^l The entire unpaid balance of principal plus accrued interest is due in / ^ r months from 
date of the Note. ^iTs/paymentdue $£> *^ *&* C^^Additional principal payments, balloon payments or other terms as 
follows / * / / ****. fH*~y»^A ">x^  JfciJC^r r?7-+^ /h***-*-!-* d?***" /t^y^i^rr 
The credit documents referenced in Section 1 of this ADDENDUM will contain a due-on-sale clause in favor of Seller. Seller 
agrees to provide to Buyer at Settlement: (a) an amortization schedule based on the above terms; (b) a written disclosure of 
the total interest Buyer will pay to maturity of the Note; and (c) the annual percentage rate on the Note based on loan closing 
costs 
3. TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS. In addition to the payments referenced in Section 2 above. Buyer shall also be 
responsible for (a) property taxes, (b) homeowners association dues; (c) special assessments: and (d) hazard insurance 
oremiums on the Property These obligations will be paid: ^ \ directly to Seller/Escrow Agent on a monthly basts [ 1 
>ctly to the applicable county treasurer, association, and insurance company as required by those entities. 
4. PAYMENT. Buyer's payments under Sections 2 and 3 above will be made to: ^ Seller [ ] an Escrow Agent. If an 
Escrow Agent, will act as Escrow Agent and will be responsible for disbursing payments on 
any underlying mortgage or deed of trust (the "underlying mortgage") and to the Seller. Cost of setting up the escrow account 
shall be paid by: [ ] Buyer [ ] Seller [ ] split evenly between the parties. 
5. LATE PAYMENT/PREPAYMENT. Any payment not made within _ / £ days after it is due is subject to a late charge 
of $ 5Z) or iT" % of the installment due. whichever is greater. Amounts in default shall bear interest at a rate 
of ^ % per annum. All or part of the principal balance on the Note may be paid prior to maturity without penalty. 
6. DUE-ON-SALE. As part of the Seller Disclosures referenced in Section 7 of the REPC. Seller shall provide to Buyer a 
copy of the underlying mortgage, the note secured thereby, and the amortization schedule. Buyer's obligation to purchase 
under this Contract is conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of those documents, in accordance with Section 8 of 
the REPC. If the holder of the underlying mortgage calls the loan due as a result of this transaction. Buyer agrees to 
discharge the underlying loan as required by the mortgage lender. In such event. Seller's remaining equity shall be paid as 
provided in the credit documents. 
7. BUYER DISCLOSURES. Buyer has provided to Seller, as a required part of this ADDENDUM, the attached Buyer 
Financial Information Sheet. Buyer may use the Buyer Financial Information Sheet approved by the Real Estate Commission 
and the Attorney General's Office, or may provide comparable written information in a different format, together with such 
additional information as Seller may reasonably require. Buyer [ ] WILL£<] WILL NOT provide Seller with copies of IRS 
returns for the two preceding tax years. Buyer acknowledges that Seller may contact Buyers current employer for verification 
of employment as represented by Buyer in the Buyer Financial Information Sheet. 
R. SELLER APPROVAL. By the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced in Section 24(b) of the REPC. Buyer shall provide 
teller at Buyer's expense, a current credit report on Buyer from a consumer credit reporting agency. Seller may use the 
..edit report and the information referenced in Section 7 of this Addendum ("Buyer Disclosures") to evaluate the credit-
worthiness of Buysr. 
P « ^ I of 2 fiH*es Seller's Initials / V l l/. Date <^-%1 — <r/fluytr's Initials 
8.1 Seller Review. By the Buy^ Jancellation Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC. Seller shall review 
he credit report and the Buyer Disclosures to determine if the content of the credit report, and the Buyer Disclosures is 
acceptable. If the content of the credit report or the Buyer Disclosures is not acceptable to Seller, Seller may elect to either 
^) provide written objections to Buyer as provided in Section 8.2 of this ADDENDUM; or (b) immediately cancel the REPC by 
ovidmg written notice to Buyer by the Buyer Cancellation Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC. The 
brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit. 
8.2 Seller Objections. If Seller does not immediately cancel the REPC as provided above. Seller may, by the Buyer 
Cancellation Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC. provide Buyer with written objections. Buyer and Seller shall 
nave seven calendar days after Buyer's receipt of the objections (the "Response Period") in which to agree in writing upon 
:he manner of resolving Seller's objections. Buyer may. but shall not be required to, resolve Seller's objections. If Seller and 
Buyer have not agreed m writing upon the manner of resolving Seller's objections, Seller may cancel the REPC by providing 
written notice to Buyer no later than three calendar days after expiration of the Response Period. The Brokerage, upon 
receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice of cancellation, shall return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit, regardless of 
whether such cancellation is before or after the Earnest Money Forfeiture Deadline. 
8.3 Failure to Object If Seller does not deliver a written objection to Buyer regarding the credit report or a Buyer 
Disclosure by the Buyer Cancellation Deadline referenced in Section 24(c) of the REPC or cancel the REPC as provided in 
Sections 8.1 or 8 2 of this ADDENDUM, the credit report and Buyer Disclosures will be deemed approved by Seller. 
9. TITLE INSURANCE. Buyer [ ] SHALLA/ ] SHALL NOT provide to Seller a lender's policy of title insurance in the 
amount of the indebtedness to the Seller, and snathpay for such policy at Settlement 
10. DISCLOSURE OF TAX IDENTIFICATION NUMBERS. By no later than the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 
24(e) of the REPC. Buyer and Seller shall disclose to each other below their respective Social Security Numbers or other 
applicable tax identification numbers so that they may comply with federal laws on reporting mortgage interest in filings with 
the internal Revenue Service. 
i 
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC. including all prbr addenda 
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers, not 
modified by this ADDENDUM shal[remain the same. J>4.Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until / [ ] AM J x l PM 
itfi S 'ountain Time 
lless so accepted, this 
^I ll re i ^<l. l l
< ^^y * ^ P ~ 5 ^ 2 ^ 7 1 9 5 0 . to accept these terms in accordance 
I  offer shall lapse. fi£> 
with ection 23 of the REPC. 
j i^ l§uyer[ [Seller Signage Date Time 
[^ Buyer ( 
Se l t^ i
Seller Signature Date 
Social Security Number 
^QftftH *7A-4&~ 74&?h 
Time Social Security NunrfGer 
CHECK ONE: 
^><£^CCEPTANCE: 
[ J COUNTEROFFER: 
ADDENDUM NO. 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION 
[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts these terms. 
[ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms set forth on the attached 
(Signature) ~jUafc*~~ / S £ ^ — (Date> (Time> 
[ ]REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects these terms. 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Signature) (Date) (Time) (Signature) (Date) (Time) 
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
EFFECTIVE JUNE 12, 1996. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM. 
Q « l l ^ < Inltifl l%^ /VV U Date Buyer's Initials. <?#$>«. *t>-n 
FIRST ADDENDUM TO REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT 
This constitutes the First Addendum to that certain REAL ESTATE PURCHASE 
CONTRACT (the "Agreement") dated April 30, 1997, by and between Max Ken* "Seller" 
and Tod B. Jones and Paul Barker or assigns, as "Buyer". 
The following terms and conditions'are hereby incorporated as part of the Agreement: 
1. Contingencies. This Offer is subject to the satisfaction of the following contingencies: 
a. Buyer obtaining to Buyer's satisfaction approval from any governing 
authorities having jurisdiction over the development of the property. Buyers 
approval of the onsite and offsite improvements required by the municipal 
authorities. 
b. The site is free from soil contamination of any kind. 
c. Buyer obtaining to Buyer's satisfaction approval from the Army Corp of 
Engineers to use and develop the site. The above approval is specifically 
regarding wetlands issues on the site. 
d. Seller will cooperate with Buyer to facilitate a tax free exchange. 
2. Extension of Closing Date. Buyer may extend the Closing Date ninety (90) days 
by paying a non-refundable deposit of $3,000. 
3. Buyer is a licensed real estate agent. 
4. Liquidated Damages and Limitation of Remedies. In the event the buyer fails, 
without legal excuse, to complete the purchase of the property, the earnest money 
deposit, and any payments then made by the Buyer shall be forfeited to the 
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EMINENT DOMAIN 78-34-11 
C.J.S. - 29AC.J.S. Eminent Domain § 96 et 
seq. 
A.L.R. — Evidentiary effect of view by jury in 
condemnation case, 1 A.L.R.3d 1397. 
Use or improvement of highway as establish-
ing grade necessary to entitle abutting owner to 
compensation on subsequent change, 2 
A.L.R.3d 985. 
Valuation at time of original wrongful entry 
by condemner or at time of subsequent initia-
tion of condemnation proceedings, 2 AX.R.3d 
1038. 
Restrictive covenant or right to enforcement 
thereof as compensable property right, 4 
A.L.R.3d 1137. 
Depreciation in value, from project for which 
land is condemned, as factor in fixing compen-
sation, 5 A.L.R.3d 901. 
Zoning as factor in determination of damages 
in eminent domain, 9 A.L.R.3d 291. 
How to obtain a jury trial in eminent domain: 
waiver, 12 A.L.R.3d 7. 
Admissibility of hearsay evidence as to com-
parable sales of other land as basis for expert's 
opinion as to land value, 12 A.L.R.3d 1064. 
Deduction of benefits in determining compen-
sation or damages in proceedings involving 
opening, widening, or otherwise altering high-
way, 13 A.L.R.3d 1149. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of argument or evidence as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 17 
A.L.R.3d 1449. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of argument or evidence as to source of 
funds to pay for property, 19 A.L.R.3d 694. 
Propriety and effect, in eminent domain pro-
ceeding, of instruction to the jury as to land-
owner's unwillingness to sell property, 20 
A.L.R.3d 1081. 
Propriety and effect of argument or evidence 
as to financial status of parties in eminent 
domain proceeding, 21 A.L.R.3d 936. 
Existence of restrictive covenant as element 
in fixing value of property condemned, 22 
A.L.R.3d 961. 
Admissibility, on issue of value of condemned 
real property, of rental value of other real 
property, 23 A.L.R.3d 724. 
Admissibility of photographs or models of 
property condemned, 23 A.L.R.3d 825. 
Cost of substitute facilities as measure of 
compensation paid to state or municipality for 
condemnation of public property, 40 A.L.R.3d 
143. 
Measure and elements of damage for limita-
tion of access caused by conversion of conven-
tional road into limited-access highway, 42 
A.L.R.3d 148. 
Measure of damages for condemnation of 
cemetery lands, 42 A.L.R.3d 1314. 
Traffic noise and vibration from highway as 
element of damages in eminent domain, 51 
A.L.R.3d 860. 
Condemned property's location in relation to 
proposed site of building as factor in fixing 
compensation, 51 A.L.R.3d 1050. 
Loss of liquor license as compensable in con-
demnation proceeding, 56 A.L.R.3d 581. 
Goodwill or "going concern" value as element 
of lessee's compensation for taking leasehold in 
eminent domain, 58 A.L.R.3d 581. 
Compensation for diminution in value of the 
remainder of property resulting from taking or 
use of adjoining land of others for the same 
undertaking, 59 A.L.R.3d 488. 
Consideration of fact that landowner's re-
maining land will be subject to special assess-
ment as factor in fixing compensation, 59 
A.L.R.3d 534. 
Condemner's liability for costs of 
condemnee's expert witnesses, 68 A.L.R.3d 546. 
Right in eminent domain proceeding to call 
as witness expert engaged but not called as 
witness by opposing party, 71 A.L.R.3d 1119. 
Determination of just compensation for con-
demnation of billboards or other advertising 
signs, 73 AX.R.3d 1122. 
Eminent domain: unity or contiguity of sepa-
rate properties sufficient to allow damages for 
diminished value of parcel remaining after tak-
ing of other parcel, 59 A.L.R.4th 308. 
Validity, construction, and effect of statute or 
lease provision expressly governing rights and 
compensation of lessee upon condemnation of 
leased property, 22 A.L.R.5th 327. 
Measure of damages or compensation in emi-
nent domain as affected by premises being 
restricted to particular educational, religious, 
charitable, or noncommercial use, 29 A.L.R.5th 
36. 
Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain ®=> 122 
et seq. 
78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued. 
For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto 
shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons, and its 
actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property 
to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken, 
but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed, as 
provided in Section 78-34-10. No improvements put upon the property subse-
585 
78-34-11 JUDICIAL CODE 
quent to the date of service of summons shall be included in the assessment of 
compensation or damages. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, tion 78-34-10" for "the next preceding section" 
Supp., 104-34-11; L. 1995, ch. 20, § 170. in the first sentence. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend- Cross-References. — Service of summons, 
ment, effective May 1, 1995, substituted "Sec- Rules 4, 5, U.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Date of accrual. 
— Interest on award. 
— Value and damages. 
Evidence of value. 
— Comparable sales. 
— Potential development. 
— Rents. 
— Subsequent improvements. 
Purpose of section. 
— Prevention of damage enhancement. 
Date of accrual. 
— Interest on award. 
Where the owners of property condemned for 
railroad purposes remained in possession and 
had the use of the property until the final order 
of condemnation, the service of summons was 
not a "taking" of the property, and hence they 
were not entitled to interest on the assessment 
of condemnation from the date of the service of 
summons to verdict, less rents and other ben-
efits of possession received by them during that 
period. Oregon Short line R.R. v. Jones, 29 
Utah 147, 80 P. 732 (1905). 
In suit by abutting owner to recover conse-
quential damages to real property caused by 
change in street grade by city, plaintiff was 
entitled to recover interest on damages from 
time of completion of grade injuring property. 
Kimball v. Salt Lake City, 32 Utah 253, 90 P. 
395, 10 L.R.A. (n.s.) 483, 125 Am. St. R. 859 
(1907). 
In action by railroad to condemn certain strip 
of ground used for school purposes to be used 
for railroad, interest on damages for land con-
demned should have been computed from time 
railroad took possession of land, and not from 
date of judgment. San Pedro, L.A. & S.L.R.R. v. 
Board of Educ, 35 Utah 13, 99 P. 263 (1909). 
In eminent domain proceeding, interest on 
award should not be computed from date of 
commencement of action, but rather from date 
of order of occupancy. Salt Lake & U.R.R. v. 
Schramm, 56 Utah 53, 189 P. 90 (1920). 
Interest is recoverable only from the time of 
taking possession of the property and not from 
the commencement of the action. State v. Peek, 
1 Utah 2d 263, 265 P.2d 630 (1953). 
—Value and damages. 
If condemnation proceedings are instituted 
against trustee in deed of trust and summons is 
served upon him, and afterwards real owners 
enter their appearance and waive summons, 
the measure of damages is value of land at time 
of entry of appearance, and not at date of 
summons issued against trustee. Oregon S.L. & 
U.N. Ry. v. Mitchell, 7 Utah 505, 27 P. 693 
(1891). 
In proceeding by railroad to condemn land, 
trial court properly fixed date that landowner's 
counsel entered voluntary appearance in open 
court which amounted to general appearance 
as time for determining the value of land taken 
and the damages to the portion not taken. 
Ogden L. & I. Ry. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62, 168 P. 
548 (1917). 
In condemnation of water right of way, value 
and damages should be measured as of time of 
service of summons, subject to proof that value 
or damages, either or both, have been lost as 
result of the condemnation. Hyde Park Town v. 
Chambers, 99 Utah 118, 104 P2d 220 (1939). 
If farm land similar to that taken is not 
available at time of trial, but was available on 
date summons was served, no severance dam-
ages based on theory that farm was a unit 
operation can be awarded. State v. Cooperative 
Sec. Corp. of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter 
Day Saints, 122 Utah 134, 247 P.2d 269 (1952). 
Service of summons is controlling date for 
valuation purposes. State v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 
167, 397 R2d 463 (1964). 
Value of condemned property under this sec-
tion was "actual value" at time of service of 
summons, including any enhancement in value 
brought about by project requiring taking of 
property in question, as long as this enhance-
ment took place prior to service of summons. 
State ex rel. Rd. Comm'n v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 
317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969). 
Property owners were entitled to compensa-
tion and damages based on value of their con-
demned property as of date on which state's 
right to condemn was finally determined, which 
was over seven years after service of summons, 
where delay was due to federal court actions 
and injunctions resulting from property own-
ers' efforts to compel state to comply with 
federal law in condemning their property for 
purposes of constructing a belt-loop as part of 
interstate freeway system. Utah State Rd. 
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78-34-9 JUDICIAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 267 Key Numbers. — Eminent Domain «= 
et seq. 198(1). 
78-34-9. Occupancy of premises pending action — De-
posit paid into court — Procedure for payment 
of compensation. 
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge thereof, at any time after the 
commencement of suit, on notice to the defendant, if he is a resident of the 
state, or has appeared by attorney in the action, otherwise by serving a notice 
directed to him on the clerk of the court, for an order permitting the plaintiff 
to occupy the premises sought to be condemned pending the action, including 
appeal, and to do such work thereon as may be required. The court or a judge 
thereof shall take proof by affidavit or otherwise of the value of the premises 
sought to be condemned and of the damages which will accrue from the 
condemnation, and of the reasons for requiring a speedy occupation, and shall 
grant or refuse the motion according to the equity of the case and the relative 
damages which may accrue to the parties. If the motion is granted, the court 
or judge shall enter its order requiring the plaintiff as a condition precedent to 
occupancy to file with the clerk of the court a sum equivalent to at least 75% 
of the condemning authority's appraised valuation of the property sought to be 
condemned. The amount thus fixed shall be for the purposes of the motion only, 
and shall not be admissible in evidence on final hearing. The rights of just 
compensation for the land so taken or damaged shall vest in the parties 
entitled thereto, and said compensation shall be ascertained and awarded as 
provided in Section 78-34-10 and established by judgment therein, and the 
said judgment shall include, as part of the just compensation awarded, interest 
at the rate of 8% per annum on the amount finally awarded as the value of the 
property and damages, from the date of taking actual possession thereof by the 
plaintiff or order of occupancy, whichever is earlier, to the date of judgment; but 
interest shall not be allowed on so much thereof as shall have been paid into 
court. Upon the application of the parties in interest, the court shall order that 
the money deposited in the court be paid forthwith for or on account of the just 
compensation to be awarded in the proceeding. A payment to a defendant as 
aforesaid shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses 
excepting his claim for greater compensation. If the compensation finally 
awarded in respect of such lands, or any parcel thereof, shall exceed the 
amount of the money so received the court shall enter judgment against the 
plaintiff for the amount of the deficiency If the amount of money so received by 
the defendant is greater than the amount finally awarded, the court shall enter 
judgment against the defendant for the amount of the excess. Upon the filing 
of the petition for immediate occupancy the court shall fix the time within 
which, and the terms upon which, the parties in possession shall be required 
to surrender possession to the plaintiff. The court shall make such orders in 
respect to encumbrances, liens, rents, assessments, insurance and other 
charges, if any, as shall be just and equitable. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. - Officers before whom 
Supp., 104-34-9; L. 1967, ch. 220, § 1. affidavits may be taken, § 78-26-5. 
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project is federally funded, then ten per-
cent of the contracts awarded must be giv-
en to DBE businesses. In the Commis-
sion's conclusions of law, it is stated: 
"Whether we agree or disagree with the 
philosophy embodied in the 'set aside' pro-
grams, they do exist, and Applicant is in a 
preferred position to obtain such work. In 
our estimation, that substantially enhances 
his chances to survive economically." 
Thus, the Commission focused on appli-
cant's minority status only to the extent 
that it enhanced his employment opportuni-
ties and thereby strengthened the pros-
pects for the success of his hauling busi-
ness. This was not improper. 
We find that the Commission's findings 
of fact as they relate to both alleged claims 
of error were not outside "the tolerable 
limits of reason" or "so unreasonable that 
[they] must be deemed capricious and arbi-
trary." Utah Department of Administra-
tive Services, 658 P.2d at 612 (citations 
omitted). 
Affirmed. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, J., 
concur. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice (concurring). 
I join the majority opinion except for that 
portion which contains language suggest-
ing that in order for the PSC to properly 
approve the issuance of a certificate of 
convenience and necessity under section 
54-6-5 of the Code, it must affirmatively 
find the applicant financially fit. Slip op. 
at 3. This is the position taken before this 
Court by the Department of Business Reg-
ulation. The PSC, on the other hand, con-
tends that under the statute, it is to issue a 
certificate unless it affirmatively finds the 
applicant un fit 
The relevant statutory language pro-
vides: 
Before granting a certificate to a com-
mon motor carrier, the commission shall 
take into consideration the financial abili-
ty of the applicant to properly perform 
the service sought under the certifi-
cate If the commission finds that 
the applicant is financially unable to 
properly perform the service sought un-
der the certificate . . . the commission 
shall not grant such certificate. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 54-6-5 (1974 ed.) (emphasis 
added). 
It seems clear to me that the PSC's posi-
tion is the correct one: the statute requires 
the Commission to take financial factors 
into account in deciding whether to issue a 
certificate, but it presumes that an appli-
cant will be entitled to a certificate. The 
burden is on one seeking a denial of the 
application. In contrast, the Department 
argues for a presumption against granting 
a certificate and contends that the burden 
is on the applicant to show its fitness. I 
think the Department turns the statute on 
its head. The statutory policy is a sound 
one; unless a good reason is shown for 
withholding a certificate, one should issue. 
The language in the majority that can be 
read as indicating that we accept the De-
partment's position is unnecessary to the 
decision and can only confuse the matter. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the 
concurring opinion of ZIMMERMAN, J. 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OP 
SALT LAKE CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Oscar Y. GRUTTER and Delia E. 
Grutter, his wife, Defendants. 
No. 18879. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 26, 1986. 
Condemnation proceeding was brought 
involving property condemned pursuant to 
redevelopment plan. Property owners ap-
pealed from judgment of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY v. GRUTTER Utah 435 
Cite as 734 P.2d 434 (Utah 1986) 
J., challenging its determination of fair 
market value. The Supreme Court, Dur-
ham, J., held that in condemnation proceed-
ings, any enhancement or decrease in value 
attributable to purpose for which property 
is being condemned would be excluded in 
determining fair market value of property. 
Affirmed. 
1. Eminent Domain <s=>124 
Any enhancement or decrease in value 
attributable to purpose for which property 
is being condemned shall be excluded in 
determining fair market value of property 
in condemnation proceedings; repudiating 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist v. 
Ward, 10 Utah 2d 29, 347 P.2d 862; State 
v. Woolley, 15 Utah 2d 248, 390 P.2d 860; 
State Road Commission v. General Oil 
Co., 22 Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718; State 
Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 
317, 452 P.2d 872. U.C.A.1953, 57-12-13. 
2. Eminent Domain <3=»124 
Trial court properly refused to allow 
evidence concerning effect of redevelop-
ment plan, pursuant to which property was 
condemned, on issue of fair market value 
of property; changing value of property 
due to project was to be disregarded in 
assessing property. U.C.A.1953, 57-12-13. 
William D. Oswald, Harold A. Hintze, 
Salt Lake City, for respondent. 
Mark S. Miner, Kerry P. Egan, Salt Lake 
City, for appellant. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
This is an appeal in a condemnation pro-
ceeding brought by the plaintiff, Redevel-
opment Agency of Salt Lake City, involving 
property owned by defendants, Oscar and 
Delia Grutter. The property was con-
demned pursuant to the Jackson Redevel-
opment Plan. The only issue before the 
court below was the fair market value of 
the property. Defendants appeal the 
amount of the jury award, claiming the 
trial court erred in refusing to allow evi-
dence concerning the effect of the Jackson 
Neighborhood Development Plan on the 
value of the property, thereby denying the 
defendants the ability to show the highest 
and best use to which the property could be 
put at the time of the taking and the oppor-
tunity to prove that such use was reason-
ably probable in the near future. For the 
reasons discussed below, we affirm. 
The parties stipulated before trial that 
plaintiff had the right to condemn defend-
ants' land, consisting of approximately two-
thirds of an acre in Salt Lake City. At the 
time of condemnation, March 2, 1981, de-
fendants' property was zoned R-6. Multi-
ple unit housing is allowed on property 
zoned R-6, subject to certain restrictions 
relating to parking and access to the prop-
erty. Defendants sought to introduce evi-
dence at trial regarding the number of 
units to be placed on defendants' property 
as a factor to be considered in determining 
its value for compensation purposes. The 
trial court allowed the testimony of defend-
ants' expert that R-6 zoning allowed up to 
twenty-five units on defendants' prof>erty. 
However, the trial court refused to allow 
evidence regarding the Jackson Neighbor-
hood Development Plan. The Jackson 
Plan, which was approved and adopted by 
ordinance of the Salt Lake City Commis-
sion on August 26, 1980, is a master plan 
for the renovation of the neighborhood in 
which defendants' property is located. It 
would allow up to eighty units per acre in 
that neighborhood, including defendants' 
property. The sole issue on appeal is 
whether the trial court erred in not permit-
ting defendants to introduce evidence 
about the Jackson Neighborhood Develop-
ment Plan. 
It appears from the record that defend-
ants failed to establish a proper foundation 
for the introduction of the excluded evi-
dence, or to adequately preserve the issue 
for appeal. Our research, however, has 
revealed such confusion in the law on the 
substantive issue argued in this case that 
we have determined to treat it on the mer-
its. 
[1,2] U.C.A., 1953, § 57-12-13, a stat-
ute not cited by either of the parties, 
states: 
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Any agency acquiring real property as 
to which it has the power to acquire 
under the eminent domain or condemna-
tion laws of this state shall comply with 
the following policies: 
(3) Any decrease or increase of 
the fair market value of real property 
prior to the date of valuation caused 
by the public improvement for which 
such property is acquired or by the 
likelihood that the property would be 
acquired for such improvement, . . . 
will be disregarded in determining the 
compensation for the property. 
While this statute applies only to "agen-
cies," and not to the courts, it does express 
a clear legislative policy to the effect that 
any change in the value of the property 
due to the project for which the property is 
being condemned is to be disregarded in 
assessing the property. This statute was 
passed in 1972. 
This Court first mentioned the enhance-
ment issue in dicta in Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 
29, 347 P.2d 862 (1959). Although the 
Ward case was decided on grounds other 
than the method of evaluation used, the 
valuation issue was discussed in order to 
instruct the trial judge about how to treat 
the case on remand. In Ward, we rejected 
the majority view and allowed the property 
owner to be compensated for the increased 
value of his land caused by the announce-
ment of the project for which the property 
was being condemned. We did not specify 
what was to be done about decreases in 
value. 
We later cited Ward in State v. Woolley, 
15 Utah 2d 248, 390 P.2d 860 (1964), a case 
in which we reviewed a condemnation of 
land for the construction of a highway. In 
Woolley, the landowner introduced evi-
dence that the condemned land had special 
value because it was near the Utah-Wyo-
ming border and well suited for a service 
station. We affirmed the trial court's de-
termination that such evidence of special 
value was admissible. Although Woolley 
was not a case dealing with enhancement, 
we cited the enhancement language from 
Ward with approval. 
We next considered the issue in State 
Road Commission v. General Oil Co., 22 
Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718 (1968). In that 
case, we inaccurately referred to the Ward 
enhancement language as the "holding" of 
that case. In General Oil, the state con-
demned land for 1-15. The trial court al-
lowed evidence of sales of similar proper-
ties, whose values had been enhanced by 
the proposed freeway construction, to be 
admitted into evidence over the State's ob-
jection. We subsequently upheld the trial 
court, relying on the "holding" in Ward 
22 Utah 2d at 62-63, 448 P.2d at 798. 
Thus, nine years after we wrote the dicta 
relating to enhancement in Ward, we relied 
upon that dicta as stare decisis in General 
Oil 
This line of cases was again cited in 
State Road Commission v. Wood, 22 Utah 
2d 317, 452 P.2d 872 (1969). Wood raised 
the question of what standards must be 
met for properties to be similar enough to 
the condemned property for use as "compa-
rables" in the appraisal process; the en-
hancement question was presented because 
the property owner introduced evidence at 
trial of sales of comparable property zoned 
residential, although his own property had 
been rezoned as industrial in anticipation of 
the condemnation for highway use. This 
Court affirmed the trial courtf s evidentiary 
ruling, even though it had the effect of 
preventing a consideration of a decrease in 
the value of the property because of the 
proposed condemnation. Inexplicably in 
that context, Wood restated the "Utah 
rule" on enhancement, citing to Woolley, 
Ward, and General Oil as the foundation 
for the rule. 22 Utah 2d at 319, 452 P.2d 
at 873. The dicta in Wood was subsequent-
ly cited by Professor Nichols. 4 J. Sack-
man, Nichols on Eminent Domain § 12.-
3151 n. 1 (3rd ed. 1985). 
Our review of Utah case law convinces 
us that this Court has never squarely faced 
the enhancement issue in a case in which it 
SPECIALTY CABINET 
Cite as 734 P.2d 
was relevant to the holding.1 In addition 
to having dubious antecedents, the Utah 
"rule" now expressly conflicts with legisla-
tive intent and is contrary to the rule ap-
plied by a majority of other jurisdictions. 
Therefore, we deem it appropriate to enun-
ciate a new rule on the valuation question. 
We hold that in condemnation proceed-
ings any enhancement or decrease in value 
attributable to the purpose for which the 
property is being condemned shall be ex-
cluded in determining the fair market value 
of the property. This rule conforms to 
legislative intent and to sound policy. 
Affirmed. 
HALL, CJ., and STEWART, HOWE, 
and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur. 
: KEY NUMBER SYSTEM, 
^^A'^A^i V 
SPECIALTY CABINET CO., INC., 
and/or State Insurance 
Fund, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Mark A. MONTOYA, Industrial Commis-
sion of Utah, and Second Injury 
Fund, Defendants. 
UTAH TECHNICAL COLLEGE and 
State Insurance Fund, Plaintiffs, 
v. 
William S. MARCHANT and Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Defendants. 
Nos. 19895, 20051. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 28, 1986. 
State insurance fund and employers 
appealed from allowance of workers' com-
pensation benefits. The Supreme Court, 
CO., INC. v. MONTOYA Utah 4 3 7 
437 (Utah 1986) 
Zimmerman, J., held that workers were in-
jured "by accident" and their injuries oc-
curred "in the course of [their] employ-
ment," thus entitling them to benefits. 
Affirmed. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
Workers* Compensation <s=>517 
Workers who suffered progressive 
back and knee injuries were injured "by 
accident" and their injuries occurred "in 
the course of [their] employment," thus 
entitling them to benefits, despite conten-
tion that precipitating event had to be time 
definite, identifiable and unusual occur-
rence and not something simply which hap-
pened within normal stresses and strains of 
employment activity. U.C.A.1953, 35-1-45. 
Fred R. Silvester and James R. Black, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Prank V. 
Nelson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, 
Gilbert A. Martinez, Richard S. Clark, II, 
Provo, for defendants. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
The State Insurance Fund and the em-
ployers involved in the two cases here de-
cided, Specialty Cabinet and Utah Technical 
College, appeal from allowance of workers' 
compensation benefits to Mark Montoya 
and William Marchant under U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 35-1-45 (1974 ed. & Supp.1986). The 
question in each case is whether the em-
ployee suffered an injury "by accident aris-
ing out of or in the course of his employ-
ment." Both cases are ruled by the hold-
ing in our recent case of Allen v. Industri-
al Commission, Utah, 729 P.2d 15 (1986). 
Based upon Allen, we hold that these em-
ployees were both injured "by accident" 
and that their injuries occurred "in the 
course of [their] employment," thus enti-
tling them to benefits. 
Claimant Montoya, a shop foreman for 
Specialty Cabinet Company since December 
1. The issue was squarely presented in General 
Oil, but we relied on the dicta in Wood rather 
than analyzing the issue. 
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wife, and Tracy Collins Bank and Trust 
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Cite as 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) 
1. Eminent Domain <S=131 
For compensation and condemnation 
proceeding to be "fair and just," it must 
reflect fair value of land to landowner. 
(Per Stewart, J., with one Justice concur-
ring.) Const. Art. 1, § 22. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 1, 1984. 
State Road Commission brought action 
to condemn part of real property owned by 
landowners, which was to be used for free-
way construction project. Order of imme-
diate occupancy was granted, but landown-
ers remained in possession of property in 
question for approximately seven and one-
half years. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, James S. Sawaya, J., entered 
order requiring property to be valued as of 
date summons was served, and landowners 
were granted leave to file an interlocutory 
appeal. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that: (1) order of immediate occupancy 
did not, under principles of res judicata, bar 
landowners from contesting state's power 
to condemn in plenary proceedings; (2) de-
lay occasioned in establishing state's right 
to condemn occasioned by federal actions 
would not justify penalizing landowners by 
valuing property as of date of service of 
summons rather than as of date property 
was finally condemned; and (3) where 
value of landowners' property substantially 
increased between service of summons and 
establishment of right to condemn, land-
owners were entitled to have property val-
ued as of date right to condemn was estab-
lished. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Oaks, J., filed concurring opinion. 
Hall, C.J., filed dissenting opinion. 
Howe, J., concurred in dissenting opin-
ion of Hall, C.J. 
definitions. 
2. Eminent Domain <£=124 
A number of factors may affect value 
of property taken pursuant to condemna-
tion proceedings, including nature of legal 
procedures established for taking private 
property. (Per Stewart, J., with one Jus-
tice concurring.) 
3. Eminent Domain <3=>124 
Critical factor in determining value of 
property taken pursuant to condemnation 
proceedings is date fixed for valuing prop-
erty in relation to when condemnor ac-
quires title; substantial interval between 
date of valuation and the latter date may 
call in question fairness of valuation, espe-
cially when value of property has been 
substantially affected in period between 
valuation and actual taking. (Per Stewart, 
J., with one Justice concurring.) 
4. Eminent Domain <§=>123 
When valuation of property taken pur-
suant to condemnation proceedings is fixed 
at date prior to actual taking and value of 
property increases during a prolonged con-
demnation proceeding so that valuation 
does not reflect fair valuation of property 
and does not therefore constitute "just 
compensation," statute fixing time of valu-
ation is unconstitutional as applied; to com-
port with constitutional requirements in a 
particular case, it is necessary, therefore, 
to consider whether protraction of judicial 
proceedings and other circumstances that 
affect value of land have had such an ef-
fect as to make valuation as of statutorily 
determined date unfair. (Per Stewart, J., 
with one Justice concurring.) Const. Art. 
1, § 22. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
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5. Eminent Domain <3=>124 
In determining whether valuation date 
fixed by statute would result in unjust 
compensation, court may have to consider 
numerous factors influencing value, includ-
ing, for example, fact that announcement 
of area-wide redevelopment plan by 
government agency, prior to initiation of 
any condemnation proceedings, may result 
in severe depreciation in land value use 
long before condemnation proceedings com-
mence; thus, once judicial proceedings 
have commenced to condemn a limited 
number of parcels in a large project involv-
ing numerous parcels, there may be sub-
stantial adverse impact on value of remain-
ing property not initially included in 
project. (Per Stewart, J., with one Justice 
concurring.) Const. Art. 1, § 22. 
6. Eminent Domain <s=>124 
Important and fundamental right pro-
tected by takings provision of State Consti-
tution cannot be made subject to unfair 
protraction or manipulation of condemna-
tion process nor to the effect of legal rules 
or procedures that take no account at all of 
numerous factual variables that affect fair 
values; failure to take into account a loss 
of value caused by condemnation process 
itself in determining just compensation 
would result in an expropriaton of the val-
ue of private property. (Per Stewart, J., 
with one Justice concurring.) Const. Art. 
1, § 22. 
7. Eminent Domain <3=>124 
To avoid expropriation of value of pri-
vate property taken pursuant to condemna-
tion proceedings, valuation dates may have 
to be set prior to service of summons when 
value of condemned property, not initially 
included in area to be condemned, has been 
diminished by condemnation by nearby 
property pursuant to planned condemna-
tion of a large area; by same token, valua-
tion date later than that established by 
statute may be required when a delay in 
proceedings results from causes for which 
condemnee is not responsible and delay 
would result in nonrecognition of value in 
award of compensation. (Per Stewart, J., 
with one Justice concurring.) Const. Art. 
I, § 22. 
8. Eminent Domain <e=>122 
Constitutional guarantee of just com-
pensation for land taken pursuant to con-
demnation proceeding protects private 
property owners, not the state. (Per Stew-
art, J.T with one Justice concurring.) 
Const. Art. 1, § 22. 
9. Eminent Domain <s=>123 
Statute providing that assessment of 
compensation and damages in condemna-
tion action shall be deemed to accrue as of 
date of service of summons allows an ap-
propriate adjustment in date of valuation to 
be made to protect state against having to 
pay an award of compensation unfair to it 
if publicly announced general plan of area-
wide condemnation has affect of artificially 
increasing value of properties not initially 
included in area to be condemned before 
judicial proceedings have been commenced, 
thereby resulting in windfall to landowner. 
(Per Stewart, J., with one Justice concur-
ring.) U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11. 
10. Eminent Domain <s=>123, 124 
Although statute providing that as-
sessment of compensation and damages in 
condemnation action shall be deemed to 
accrue as of date of service of summons 
would be unconstitutional as applied if it 
required valuation of landowners' property 
as of date of service of summons irrespec-
tive of all circumstances affecting value 
and even though value of their property 
had substantially appreciated during the 
approximately seven and one-half years be-
tween service of summons and state's es-
tablishment of its right to condemn, statu-
tory term "deemed to have accrued" ad-
mits a more flexible construction and does 
not mandate that date of service of sum-
mons be date for valuation in all cases 
without regard to facts of particular case. 
(Per Stewart, J., with one Justice concur-
ring.) U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11. 
I I . Statutes <3>184, 205 
Fundamental principle of statutory 
construction is that a statute should be 
construed as a whole, and its terms should 
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be construed to be harmonious with each taking of property is necessary and that 
other and overall objective of statute. (Per property will be dedicated to a public use. 
Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.) Const. Art. 1, § 22. 
12. Constitutional Law <S=>48(1) 
Supreme Court is constrained to con-
strue statutory terms to avoid an unconsti-
tutional application of statute. (Per Stew-
art, J., with one Justice concurring.) 
13. Eminent Domain <£=>200 
Statute providing that an assessment 
of compensation and damages in a condem-
nation action shall be "deemed to accrue" 
as of date of service of summons creates a 
rebuttable presumption that date for deter-
mining valuation shall be date of service of 
process by its use of the term "deem"; to 
rebut such presumption, unfairness of va-
luing property as of date of service must 
be evident and difference in value must not 
be insignificant. (Per Stewart, J., with one 
Justice concurring.) U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11. 
14. Eminent Domain <§=>124 
Under statute providing that assess-
ment of compensation and damages in a 
condemnation action shall be deemed to 
accrue as of date of service of summons, 
valuation as of date of service will be the 
rule, and departure from such rule will be 
the exception. (Per Stewart, J., with one 
Justice concurring.) U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11. 
15. Eminent Domain <3=>200 
Statutory presumption that property 
taken in condemnation proceeding shall be 
valued as of date of service of summons 
may be rebutted either by the state or by 
property owner by showing that valuation 
as of date of service would result in an 
award that would not provide "just com-
pensation" to landowner or be fair to state; 
burden to rebut such presumption is on 
party which asserts that valuation as of 
date of service would be unfair. (Per 
Stewart, J., with one Justice concurring.) 
U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11. 
16. Eminent Domain <§=>196 
In condemnation proceeding, state has 
burden of coming forward with evidence 
of, and burden of persuasion to establish, 
its right to condemn; it must prove that 
17. Eminent Domain <s=*200 
Only after state has established ele-
ments of a cause of action for condemna-
tion must property owner prove amount of 
compensation to which he is entitled. 
Const. Art. 1, § 22. 
18. Eminent Domain e=>196 
If condemnor's authority to condemn is 
challenged, prima facie showing of right to 
condemn must be made to support an order 
of immediate occupancy, but a prima facie 
showing is not final determination of au-
thority; such showing simply requires 
state to adduce some evidence to prove that 
it has fulfilled necessary preconditions to 
exercise of power ,of eminent domain, a 
procedure similar to entry of preliminary 
injunction. Const. Art. 1, § 22. 
19. Eminent Domain <e=*187 
Order of immediate occupancy pursu-
ant to condemnation proceedings is entered 
pendente lite and only authorizes state to 
take immediate possession until final adju-
dication of merits. 
20. Eminent Domain <3=>187 
Order of immediate occupancy in con-
demnation proceeding, which expressly 
stated that pending further hearing and 
trial on issues presented in action and sub-
ject to conditions set forth, landowners 
could not interfere with state's possession 
of premises in question, and which made no 
finding as to state's authority to condemn, 
did not decide jurisdictional conditions 
precedent to final order and decree; order 
clearly contemplated that issues relating to 
state's authority to condemn were to be 
decided in further hearing. 
21. Eminent Domain <S=>198(1) 
State's right to condemn, if challenged, 
can finally be determined only after trial on 
merits, not at hearing on motion for imme-
diate occupancy. 
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22. Eminent Domain <3=>198(1) 
Defendant may be barred from litigat-
ing merits of state's authority to condemn 
after an order of immediate occupancy has 
been granted if he waives his right to liti-
gate such issues or he withdraws money 
deposited by state in obtaining order; oth-
erwise, condemnor's power to condemn 
may be litigated in a plenary trial on the 
merits. U.C.A.1953, 78-34-9^ 
23. Eminent Domain <3=>243(2) 
Since an order of immediate occupancy 
in condemnation proceedings only requires 
prima facie proof of right to condemn, such 
order is not a final adjudication on merits, 
and thus, res judicata has no application to 
such order. 
24. Judgment <°^650 
Res judicata has no application in ab-
sence of final adjudication. 
25. Eminent Domain <£=>243(2) 
Order in condemnation proceeding 
granting state right of immediate occupan-
cy, which right was challenged by landown-
ers at hearing on motion for immediate 
occupancy, did not, under rules of res judi-
cata, prohibit landowners' express reserva-
tion of a right to contest state's power to 
condemn in plenary proceedings. 
26. Eminent Domain <3=>198(1) 
Landowners are not required to meek-
ly yield to state's claim to condemn their 
land; every landowner has right to resist 
with every legal means available the expro-
priation of his or her land. Const. Art. 1, 
§ 22. 
27. Eminent Domain e=>169 
Since state has burden of proving its 
right to exercise power to condemn, state 
must be prepared to establish that it has 
complied with all necessary conditions 
precedent. Const. Art. 1, § 22. 
28. Eminent Domain <s=*124 
Delay of approximately seven and one-
half years in condemnation of landowner's 
property occasioned by federal action seek-
ing to enjoin state from further construc-
tion of freeway, the construction of which 
resulted in an attempt to condemn land-
owner's property, until Environmental Im-
pact Statement was filed and another fed-
eral action challenging adequacy of such 
statement once it was filed, would not justi-
fy penalizing landowners by requiring that 
property be valued as of date of service 
rather than as of date condemnation be-
came final, since it was the state that had 
affirmative obligation to comply with Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act, despite 
landowners' participation in initial federal 
action. Const. Art. 1, § 22; U.C.A.1953, 
78-34-11; National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969, § 2 et seq., as amended 42 
U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq. 
29. States <s=>4.8 
To penalize landowners' right to "just 
compensation" for taking of condemned 
land by compensating them for value of 
land as of date of service of summons for 
compensation proceeding rather than value 
of land seven and one-half years later, 
when right to condemn was established, 
because of landowners' assertion of a fed-
eral right pursuant to action seeking to 
enjoin freeway project pursuant to which 
land was condemned until filing of an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement, would violate 
supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution. (Per Stewart, J., with one Justice 
concurring.) National Environmental Poli-
cy Act of 1969, § 2 et seq., as amended 42 
U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq.; U.C.A.1953, 78-
34-11; U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 6, cl. 2. 
30. States <3>4.1 
State cannot penalize assertion of fed-
eral right by requiring individual asserting 
it to give up state constitutional right. 
31. Eminent Domain <S=>124 
Where approximately seven and one-
half years elapsed between service of sum-
mons to condemn landowner's land and es-
tablishment of state's right to condemn, 
and where there was substantial increase 
in value of landowners' property during 
period that proceeding was pending, differ-
ence in the valuation of landowners' prop-
erty between date of service and summons 
and date when right to condemn was set-
tled was "evident and significant," and 
thus, landowners were entitled to have land 
valuated as of date state's right to con-
UTAH STATE ROAD 
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demn was settled. Const. Art. 1, § 22; 
U.C.A.1953, 78-34-11. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
Robert S. Campbell, E. Barney Gesas, 
Roy B. Moore, Salt Lake City, for defend-
ants and appellants. 
David L. Wilkinson, Atty. Gen., Donald 
S. Coleman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake 
City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The Utah State Road Commission (here-
after "the State")* commenced this action 
June 23, 1972, to condemn a part of real 
property owned by Arnold and Hedve Fri-
berg. The property was to be used for 
construction of the southeast segment of 
1-215, a belt-loop freeway project in Salt 
Lake County. The trial court granted an 
order of immediate occupancy in December, 
1972, but for various reasons discussed be-
low, the completion of the condemnation 
proceedings was delayed, and the Fribergs 
remained in possession pursuant to a stipu-
lation until approximately March 15, 1980. 
The defendants contend that after June, 
1972, the value of the Fribergs' property 
appreciated substantially. Prior to a trial 
to determine compensation to be held in 
1980, the Fribergs moved to have the prop-
erty valued as of the date the State finally 
established its legal right to condemn, De-
cember 12, 1979. The trial court ruled that 
the property was to be valued when sum-
mons was served pursuant to U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 78-34-11, some seven and one-half years 
earlier. Because of the importance of the 
question involved, this Court granted leave 
to file an interlocutory appeal. 
The Fribergs' contention on appeal is 
that § 78-34-11, which states that the as-
sessment of compensation and damages in 
a condemnation action shall be deemed to 
accrue as of the date of service of sum-
mons, does not necessarily fix the date of 
valuation as of that date when there has 
1. The Utah Department of Transportation is the 
successor agency to the Utah State Road Com-
mission. Under Utah law, a number of govern-
mental and private entities have been granted 
the power to take private property by eminent 
domain. In this opinion, we use the term 
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been a long delay in the entry of a final 
decree and the property has substantially 
appreciated in value in the intervening 
time. Alternatively, they argue that if 
§ 78-34-11 does require valuation in all 
cases to be determined as of the date of 
service of summons, that section is uncon-
stitutional as applied to the facts of this 
case. The State's position is threefold: (1) 
§ 78-34-11 fixes valuation as of the date of 
service of summons irrespective of delay in 
the entry of a final decree; (2) the Fri-
bergs' property should be valued as of that 
date in any event because the order for 
immediate occupancy, entered shortly after 
service of process, established the State's 
right to condemn and occupy the Fribergs' 
property; and (3) in any event, the Fribergs 
were responsible for the delay in prosecut-
ing this action and should not be permitted 
to profit from that delay. 
I. THE FACTS 
The Fribergs owned 5.33 acres located in 
the east Cottonwood area of the Salt Lake 
Valley, where they lived for some 20 years. 
In June, 1972, the State commenced judicial 
proceedings to condemn the westerly 2.58 
acres of the Friberg property. In August, 
1972, the Fribergs filed their answer, alleg-
ing that the State had failed to comply with 
statutory and jurisdictional requirements 
necessary to establish its right to condemn 
the Friberg property and therefore had no 
authority to condemn the property. 
The parties by a stipulation dated Decem-
ber 6, 1972, agreed that an order of imme-
diate occupancy could be entered, and on 
December 14, 1972, some three months af-
ter the Fribergs filed their answer, the 
district court entered an order granting the 
State immediate occupancy, pendente lite. 
The order also incorporated the terms of a 
stipulation between the parties which pro-
vided that (1) the State would deposit with 
the clerk of the district court $80,800 pay-
able immediately to the plaintiffs; (2) the 
"State" to refer to the plaintiff in this action and 
to condemnors generally where the text indi-
cates that the term should be so construed since 
the principles announced herein should apply 
irrespective of who the condemnor is. 
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Fnbergs could remain on the property rent-
free until September 1, 1973, and thereaft-
er on a month-to-month basis; and (3) the 
Fribergs were entitled to thirty days' no-
tice before being required to vacate the 
property. The Fribergs left the funds on 
deposit with the court, and thereby pre-
served their right to challenge the authori-
ty of the State to condemn the property.2 
On August 14, 1973, after the federal 
lawsuit referred to below was filed, the 
State notified the Fribergs that they were 
to vacate the premises by October 1, 1973, 
but also indicated that the Fribergs could 
remain in possession under certain condi-
tions. Apparently because of uncertainty 
that their property would in fact be utilized 
for the specified project, the Fribergs, in 
response to the notice to vacate, moved to 
dismiss the condemnation proceeding. The 
motion was denied when the State agreed 
that the Fribergs could remain in posses-
sion as long as possible. 
On July 13, 1973, an action was com-
menced in the United States Federal Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah by a 
group of citizens from the Cottonwood area 
in Salt Lake County who opposed the align-
ment of the proposed freeway through the 
suburban area in which they resided. The 
action sought to enjoin the State from fur-
ther construction of the freeway until an 
Environmental Impact Statement (E.I.S.) 
was filed pursuant to the National Environ-
2. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-9 provides for a waiver 
of all defenses except for a claim of greater 
compensation if the deposit is withdrawn. It 
states in pertinent part 
The plaintiff may move the court or a judge 
thereof, at any time after the commencement 
of suit, on notice to the defendant, for an 
order permitting the plaintiff to occupy the 
premises sought to be condemned pending the 
action, including appeal, and to do such work 
thereon as may be required The court or a 
judge thereof shall take proof of the value 
of the premises and of the damages which 
will accrue , and of the reasons for requir-
ing a speedy occupation, and shall grant or 
refuse the motion according to the equity of 
the case A payment to a defendant [of 
the value of the property] shall be held to be 
an abandonment by such defendant of all 
defenses excepting his claim for greater com-
pensation Upon the filing of the petition 
mental Policy Act of 1969, § 2, et seq., 83 
Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. § 4321, et seq. (1976). 
The Fribergs were among the named plain-
tiffs who filed the federal action. The 
State admitted that it had not filed an 
E.I.S. In January, 1974, the federal court 
ordered the State to prepare and file an 
E.I.S. and enjoined the State, pending the 
filing of an E.I.S., from performing any 
further construction activities related to 
the belt-loop project.3 Some four years 
later, the State filed an E.I.S., which was 
finally approved by the Federal Highway 
Administration on February 7, 1978, ap-
proximately five years and eight months 
after service of the summons and com-
plaint in the instant case. 
For more than a year following the ap-
proval of the E.I.S., the Commission did 
nothing to proceed with construction of I -
215 in the area near the Friberg property 
and took no action to have the Fribergs 
vacate the property. Although the record 
is not entirely clear on the point, the reason 
for this delay appears to have been the lack 
of funds for the project. In any event, the 
delay was not attributable to the Fribergs, 
although they clearly wanted to remain in 
possession as long as possible. 
On February 6, 1979, approximately ten 
months after approval of the E.I.S., a sec-
ond federal action challenging the adequa-
cy of the E.I.S. was commenced by Cotton-
wood, Inc., a neighborhood citizens' group 
for immediate occupancy the court shall fix 
the time within which, and the terms upon 
which, the parties in possession shall be re-
quired to surrender possession to the plaintiff. 
3. The E.I.S. was required because the State uti-
lized federal matching funds for construction of 
the freeway. The State did not contest the re-
quirement that it prepare an E.I.S., although on 
this appeal it contends that it voluntarily decid-
ed to comply with the Environmental Policy Act 
even though it was not legally required to do so. 
The State's contention is that the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act became effective after the 
initiation of this project and therefore was not 
applicable. That point was not litigated in the 
federal court proceeding, and it is not pertinent 
here. The critical point is the entry of the 
federal injunction against further action in con-
nection with the building of 1-215. 
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from the same general area as the Fri- indirect support of the two federal law-
bergs. The Fribergs were neither mem- suits. 
bers of Cottonwood, Inc., nor parties to the
 S h o r t ] y a f t e r t h a t r u ] j n g ) t h e S t a t e 
action, although they did donate funds to
 s e r v e d t h e F r i b e r g s w i t h a n o t i c e t o v a c a t e 
the organization. On May 7, 1979, the the premises in compliance with the Decem-
federal district court again enjoined the
 b e r 14> m 2 Q r d e r o f i m m e d i a t e occupancy. 
State from undertaking further actions The Fribergs continued to resist and again 
with respect to the 1-215 project pending a
 a s s e r t e d t h a t t h e S t a t e h a d n o t p r o v e d t h e 
determination of the sufficiency of the
 J u r i s d i c t i o n a l prerequisites necessary to 
E.I.S. The State did not oppose the is-
 e r n p o w e r t h e S t a t e t o c o n d e m n the Fri-
suance of the injunction. On October 31,
 b e r g g , p r o p e r t y .5 Specifically, the Fribergs 
1979, that court held that the E.I.S. was
 a g s e r t e d t h a t t h e r e h a d b e e n n 0 e v i d e n c e 
legally sufficient and dissolved the injunc-
 r e ] a t i n g t o t h e p u b l j c n e c e s s i t y f o r taking 
t l0n
- their property or the relative importance of 
Notwithstanding the delays caused by the public good and private injury. The 
the lawsuits, it was not until approximately Fribergs also contended that resolution of 
mid-November, 1979, that the Utah Depart- the Cottonwood, Inc. case, which was at 
ment of Transportation4 completed the that time still pending in the federal dis-
"details for the final design of the north- trict court, might result in the proposed 
south segment of the Southeast Quadrant highway project's not going forward and 
between 4500 South and 6400 South," the that any action by the state court should 
segment for which the Friberg property await the outcome of the federal court ac-
was needed. tion. 
On September 19, 1979, while the federal 
district court injunction was still in effect 
in the Cottonwood case, the Fribergs filed 
a motion in the instant case to dismiss the 
complaint based on the State's failure to 
prosecute. The Fribergs contended that 
the property had appreciated substantially 
in value during the long interval between 
the commencement of the condemnation ac-
tion in June, 1972, and their filing of the 
motion to dismiss and that it would be 
unfair to fix compensation as of a time 
some seven years earlier. In October, 
1979, the trial court denied the Fribergs' 
motion to dismiss on the ground that the 
delay in bringing the case to a conclusion 
had resulted from the Fribergs' direct and 
4. See footnote 1, supra. 
5. The conditions precedent to a taking are estab-
lished by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-4: 
Before property can be taken it must appear: 
(1) That the use to which it is to be applied 
is a use authorized by law; 
(2) That the taking is necessary to such use; 
and 
(3) If already appropriated to some public 
use, that the public use to which it is to be 
applied is a more necessary public use. 
In December, 1979, after the conclusion 
of the Cottonwood, Inc. case and the disso-
lution of the federal injunction, the parties 
entered into a stipulation that was incorpo-
rated into a court order dated December 
12, 1979. That order established the 
State's right to condemn and reserved for 
later determination the amount of compen-
sation to be awarded and the date for de-
termining valuation. The order also direct-
ed the Fribergs to vacate the premises on 
or before March 15, 1980, and the disburse-
ment to the Fribergs of the $80,800 the 
State had deposited with the court. The 
order specifically states that it was made 
without prejudice to the Fribergs' conten-
tions as to the compensation issues. 
In 1981, the Legislature amended § 78-34-4 
to state: 
"(3) That construction and use of all property 
sought to be condemned will commence within 
a reasonable time as determined by the court, 
after the initiation of proceedings under this 
chapter." The old section (3) became the new 
section (4). In addition, the Legislature enacted 
§ 78-34-19, which provides for an action to set 
aside condemnation proceedings for failure to 
commence or complete construction within a 
reasonable time. 
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The Fribergs' motion to fix the valuation 
date as of the date the right to condemn 
was established, December 12, 1979, rather 
than the date of service of process was 
denied by the trial court on the ground that 
§ 78-34-11 required that the value of the 
Friberg land be determined as of June 23, 
1972, and this appeal followed. 
II. JUST COMPENSATION AND THE 
VALUATION OF PROPERTY 
[1] Article I, § 22 of the Utah Constitu-
tion provides that "[p]nvate property shall 
not be taken or damaged for public use 
without just compensation/' The constitu-
tional requirement of just compensation de-
rives "as much content from the basic equi-
table principles of fairness as it does from 
technical concepts of property law," when 
the State takes private property for the 
public welfare. United States v. Fuller, 
409 U.S. 488, 490, 93 S.Ct. 801, 803, 35 
L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). For compensation to be 
fair and just, it must reflect the fair value 
of the land to the landowner. "Just com-
pensation means that the owners must be 
put in as good a position money wise as 
they would have occupied had their proper-
ty not been taken." State v. Noble, 6 Utah 
2d 40, 43, 305 P.2d 495, 497 (1956). 
[2,3] A number of factors may affect 
the value of property taken pursuant to 
condemnation proceedings, including the 
nature of the legal procedures established 
for taking private property. A critical fac-
tor is the date fixed for valuing property in 
relation to when the condemnor acquires 
title, or in this case, when entitlement to 
condemn is established A substantial in-
terval between the date of valuation and 
the latter date may call in question the 
fairness of the valuation, especially when 
the value of the property has been substan-
tially affected in the period between valua-
tion and the actual taking. 
6. In City of South Ogden v. Fujiki, Utah, 621 
P.2d 1254 (1980), cited above, the condemning 
authority did not take possession of the land 
until a final judgment was entered. The land-
owner claimed that it was a denial of just com-
pensation not to award interest on the compen 
sation award from the date of service of process 
Because an extraordinary delay occurred 
in the instant case after the statutory date 
fixed to value the Friberg property and the 
State established its right to condemn, the 
initial issue to be determined, assuming at 
this point that defendants did not cause the 
delay, is whether U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-11 
requires the valuation to be determined as 
of the date of service or whether it may 
allow valuation at some time other than 
when process was served. Section 78-34-
11 states that the right to compensation 
and the date for assessing compensation 
shall be deemed to accrue as of the date of 
service of summons: 
For the purpose of assessing compensa-
tion and damages, the right thereto shall 
be deemed to have accrued at the date 
of the service of summons, and its actu-
al value at that date shall be the meas-
ure of compensation for all property to 
be actually taken, and the basis of dam-
ages to property not actually taken, but 
injuriously affected, in all cases where 
such damages are allowed, as provided in 
the next preceding section [78-34-10]. 
No improvements put upon the property 
subsequent to the date of service of sum-
mons shall be included in the assessment 
of compensation or damages. [Emphasis 
added.] 
All the cases that have heretofore been 
decided under this section or its predeces-
sor have relied upon the date of service of 
summons in determining valuation. E.g., 
City of South Ogden v. Fujiki, Utah, 621 
P.2d 1254 (1980); State ex rel. Road Com-
mission v. Wood, 22 Utah 2d 317, 452 P.2d 
872 (1969); State ex rel. Engineering 
Commission v. Peek, 1 Utah 2d 263, 265 
P.2d 630 (1953); Oregon Short Line Rail-
road Co. v. Jones, 29 Utah 147, 80 P. 732 
(1905). In none of these cases, however, 
was the delay in any degree comparable to 
the instant case.6 
because the land had appreciated from 15% to 
20% between the service of summons and the 
final judgment. Because the City had not ob-
tained an order of immediate occupancy, the 
Court held that § 78-34-9 only authorized inter-
est from the date of the City's actual occupation 
and that the denial of interest did not constitute 
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[4] We are, of course, constrained to 
construe § 78-34-11 within the limitations 
of constitutional requirements. When val-
uation is fixed at a date prior to the actual 
taking and the value of the property in-
creases during a prolonged condemnation 
proceeding so that the valuation does not 
reflect a fair valuation of the property and 
does not therefore constitute "just compen-
sation," the statute fixing the time of valu-
ation is unconstitutional as applied. Oro-
no-Veazie Water District v. Penobscot 
County Water Co., Me., 348 A.2d 249 
(1975). Accord State v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 
70, 358 P.2d 174 (1960); Sanitary District 
of Chicago v. Chapin, 226 111. 499, 80 N.E. 
1017 (1907).7 A leading treatise in the area 
of eminent domain law, 3 Nichols on Emi-
nent Domain § 8.5[2], 8-108 to 8-111 (3d 
ed. 1981), states: 
In several states it is held that the filing 
of the petition to condemn, being the 
first actual step toward devoting the 
property to a public use, marks a point of 
time that is as fair and just to both 
parties for fixing the value of the proper-
ty as any that could be selected, and it 
has, consequently, been adopted as the 
established date as of which damages are 
assessed. In such jurisdictions, however, 
if a corporation unreasonably delays the 
prosecution of its petition while the land 
is advancing in value, the application of 
the rule would work great wrong and 
injustice to the owner, and the petitioner 
would be able to acquire the property at 
much less than its value at the date of 
the t ak ing . . . . Where the statute pro-
vides for the date of valuation at the 
initial step in the acquisition process, 
such as upon the passage of a resolution 
authorizing the condemnation, and then 
permits a protracted period of time for 
the prosecution of the proceeding, during 
a violation of Article I, § 22 of the Constitution. 
No claim was made that the valuation date was 
improper. 
7. In Chapin, the Court stated: 
The filing of the petition is the first actual step 
toward devoting property to a public use, and 
in ordinary cases that time is as fair and just 
to both parties for fixing the value of the 
property as any that could be adopted. At 
which time the value of the property may 
rise or fall, the statute is unconstitution-
al as conflicting with the constitutional 
concept of "just compensation". 
To comport with constitutional require-
ments in a particular case, it is necessary, 
therefore, to consider whether the protrac-
tion of judicial proceedings and other cir-
cumstances that affect the value of the 
land have had such an effect as to make a 
valuation as of a statutorily determined 
date unfair. In Uvodich v. Arizona Board 
of Regents, 9 Ariz.App. 400, 453 P.2d 229, 
235 (1969), the court, construing a statute 
similar to Utah's, addressed the issue of 
the fairness of valuing property that had 
depreciated as a result of the taking: 
State i\ Hollis [93 Ariz. 200, 379 P.2d 
750 (1963)] recognizes that arbitrary ap-
plication of A.R.S. § 12-1123 [setting the 
valuation date of condemned property at 
the time of service of summons], is not 
required where application of the statute 
would result in unjust compensation to 
the property owner. The logical conclu-
sion, therefore, is that the time as of 
which the evaluation of the property 
should be made must comport with the 
peculiar facts and circumstances of the 
case so as to assure the property owner 
compensation which is just, as contem-
plated by the Arizona Constitution. 
See also State i\ Hollisf 93 Ariz. 200, 379 
P.2d 750 (1963). 
In a similar vein, Board of County Com-
missioners of Garfield County v. Dela-
ney, 41 Colo.App. 548, 592 P.2d 1338 (1978), 
held that a statute requiring the determina-
tion of valuation as of the date of the order 
of possession could not be construed strict-
ly when the result would be fundamentally 
unfair to the expropriated landowner. Cf 
any rate, the rule is firmly established; but if 
it should be applied to a case like this, where 
the owner has not been brought into court, 
and no steps have been taken for several 
years, during which property has greatly ad-
vanced in value, it would result in wrong and 
injustice. 
80 N.E. at 1019. 
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State v. Griggs, 89 Ariz. 70, 358 P.2d 174 
(1960). See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 
751 (1971). 
[5] In determining whether a valuation 
date fixed by statute would result in unjust 
compensation, a court may have to consider 
numerous factors that influence value. 
Uvodich v. Arizona Board of Regents, su-
pra. Experience teaches, for example, 
that the announcement of an area-wide re-
development plan by a government agency, 
prior to the initiation of any condemnation 
proceedings, may result in severe deprecia-
tion in land values long before the condem-
nation proceedings commence. Thus, once 
judicial proceedings are commenced to con-
demn a limited number of parcels in a large 
project involving numerous parcels, there 
may be a substantial adverse impact on the 
value of the remaining properties not ini-
tially included in the project. In City of 
Cleveland v. Kacmarik, 17 Ohio Op.2d 
135, 177 N.E.2d 811, 813 (Ct.C.P.1961), the 
court observed: 
As houses begin to come down, tenants 
in nearby homes move out, the neighbor-
hood deteriorates or is deserted, vandal-
ism often sets in, appearances and values 
depreciate with the result that frequently 
the property owner is greatly handi-
capped in presenting his case to the jury 
by the time his land gets into court. 
[6] The important and fundamental 
right protected by Article I, § 22 of the 
Utah Constitution cannot be made subject 
to undue protraction or manipulation of the 
condemnation process or to the effect of 
legal rules or procedures that take no ac-
count at all of the numerous factual varia-
bles that affect fair values. A failure to 
take into account a loss of value caused by 
the condemnation process itself in deter-
mining just compensation would result in 
8. A publicly announced general plan of area-
wide condemnation may have the effect of arti-
ficially increasing the value of properties not 
initially included in the area to be condemned 
before judicial proceedings have been com-
menced, therebv resulting in a windfall to the 
landowner. See United Stares v. Miller, 317 U.S. 
369, 63 S.Ct. 276, 87 L.Ed. 336 (1942). Although 
an expropriation of the value of private 
property. 
[7-9] To avoid such results, courts have 
set valuation dates prior to the service of 
summons when the value of condemned 
property, not initially included in the area 
to be condemned, has been diminished by 
the condemnation of nearby properties pur-
suant to the planned condemnation of a 
large area. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 
8 Cal.3d 39, 104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345 
(1972); 1 L. Orgel, Valuation Under the 
Law of Eminent Domain, § 105 at 447 (2d 
ed. 1953). Cf United States v. Virginia 
Electric and Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 81 
S.Ct. 784, 5 L.Ed.2d 838 (1961). See gener-
ally Note, The Condemnor's Liability for 
Damages Arising Through Instituting, 
Litigating, or Abandoning Eminent Do-
main Proceedings, 1967 Utah L.Rev. 548. 
By the same token, a valuation date later 
than that established by statute may be 
required when a delay in the condemnation 
proceedings results from causes for which 
the condemnee is not responsible and the 
delay would result in a nonrecognition of 
value in the award of compensation.8 
[10] Therefore, if § 78-34-11 requires 
the valuation of the Fribergs' property as 
of the date of service of summons irrespec-
tive of all circumstances that affect value 
and even though the value of their proper-
ty had substantially appreciated by the 
time the State established its right to con-
demn, § 78-34-11 would be unconstitution-
al as applied under Article I, § 22. See 
Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal.3d 39, 
104 Cal.Rptr. 1, 500 P.2d 1345 (1972); 
Board of County Commissioners of Gar-
field County v. Delaney, 41 Colo.App. 548, 
592 P.2d 1338 (1978); Orono-Veazie Water 
District v. Penobscot County Water Co., 
Me., 348 A.2d 249 (1975). See generally 
the constitutional guarantee of just compensa-
tion protects private property owners and not 
the State, our interpretation of § 78-34-11, dis-
cussed infra, allows an appropriate adjustment 
in the date of valuation to be made to protect 
the State against having to pay an award of 
compensation unfair to it. 
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However, the language of § 78-34-11 ad-
mits of a more flexible construction than 
that placed on it by the State. The statuto-
ry term "deemed to have accrued" does not 
mandate that the date of service of sum-
mons be the date for valuation in all cases 
and without regard to the facts of the 
particular case. 
[11,12] In the first place, a fundamen-
tal principle of statutory construction is 
that a statute should be construed as a 
whole, and its terms should be construed to 
be harmonious with each other and the 
overall objective of the statute. Cannon v. 
McDonald, Utah, 615 P.2d 1268 (1980); 
Crist v. Bishop, Utah, 520 P.2d 196 (1974). 
Moreover, we are constrained to construe 
statutory terms to avoid an unconstitution-
al application of the statute. State v. 
Wood, Utah, 648 P.2d 71 (1982); In re 
Boyer, Utah, 636 P.2d 1085 (1981). 
The Legislature's use of nonmandatory 
language indicates a policy of flexibility. 
That conclusion is emphasized by the provi-
sion of § 78-34-11 that no improvements 
placed upon the property subsequent to 
service of process shall be included in the 
assessment of compensation and damages. 
That provision would be redundant if the 
prior sentence flatly required assessment 
of compensation and damages in all cases 
as of the date of service of summons. 
Furthermore, the statutory phrase 
"deem to have accrued" imports a degree 
of flexibility into the valuation scheme of 
§ 78-34-11. The policy of flexibility is 
demonstrated particularly by the word 
"deem." The meaning of the term must of 
course arise from its statutory context, see 
11A Words & Phrases 181-87 (1971), as 
well as its constitutional environment, espe-
cially when the validity of a statute and its 
application are so closely dependent upon 
conformity to strict constitutional require-
ments. 
In a somewhat different context, we 
have held that the term "deem" is to be 
construed in light of the purpose to be 
COM'N v. FRIBERG Utah 831 
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accomplished by the statute. In Brimm v. 
Cache Valley Banking Co,, 2 Utah 2d 93, 
269 P.2d 859 (1954), the Court stated that 
the term "deem" may be construed to es-
tablish either a conclusive or a rebuttable 
presumption, depending on the context in 
which it is used. Under the statutory 
scheme then under consideration, the Court 
held that the term "shall be deemed" 
should be construed to impose a rebuttable 
presumption. 
[13] The varying factors that may af-
fect the determination of just compensa-
tion, the necessity of a practicable and rea-
sonably predictable rule of procedure, and 
the language of § 78-34-11 lead us to con-
clude that the term "deem" as used in 
§ 78-34-11 creates a rebuttable presump-
tion that the date for determining valuation 
shall be the date of service of process. 
To rebut that presumption, the unfair-
ness of valuing property as of that date 
must be evident and the difference in value 
must not be insignificant. In the vast ma-
jority of cases, the date of service of sum-
mons will be the appropriate date for deter-
mining valuation, and no judicial time need 
be expended in determining whether anoth-
er date would be more advantageous to one 
party or the other to some small degree. 
We do not mean to imply that "slight" 
violations of constitutional rights should be 
overlooked. The perimeters of a constitu-
tional right are not to be slowly constricted 
by a series of slight, but ever encroaching, 
violations. However, the right to just com-
pensation is unlike any other constitutional 
right; it depends on a fair and reasonable 
estimate of money value. By necessity, 
such a valuation does not turn on physical-
ly ascertainable facts or even on a more or 
less precise formula for defining value, but 
rather on variable and imprecise judgments 
made by reasonable persons who generally, 
if not always, come to different conclu-
sions. 
Neither the constitutional right of the 
landowner or the right of the State to 
fairness would find root in firmer ground if 
the statutory language were construed so 
loosely as to permit the service of sum-
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mons date to be regularly challenged on 
the basis of appraisals that, at most, might 
result in minor differences in the valuation. 
On the contrary, the constitutional right 
and the interests it protects, both directly 
and indirectly, are accorded greater protec-
tion by a substantial degree of certainty, 
which will reduce the cost of litigation and 
promote the expeditious disposition of con-
demnation suits, thereby allowing the con-
demnee to adjust with as little disruption 
as possible to the impact of the condemna-
tion. 
[14] Since in any given case the number 
and type of factors that affect value and 
the weight to be accorded each factor will 
vary, it is not possible to formulate a pre-
cise guideline for when a court should ad-
here to the service of summons date and 
when it should depart from it; the nature 
of the problem simply does not permit 
greater precision. Suffice it to state that 
valuation as of the service of summons 
date will be the rule, and departure from 
that rule will be the exception. 
[15] Finally, it should be noted that the 
presumption established by § 78-34-11 
may be rebutted either by the State or by a 
property owner by a showing that a valua-
tion as of the date of service of summons 
would result in an award that would not 
provide "just compensation'' to a landown-
er or be fair to the State. It follows that 
the burden to rebut the presumption estab-
lished by § 78-34-1 is on the party which 
asserts that valuation as of the date of 
service of summons would be unfair.9 
III. DELAY IN PROCEEDINGS 
The State contends that the trial court 
found that the State had met all the statu-
tory and constitutional requirements neces-
sary for the State to establish its right to 
condemn the property when the trial court 
entered its order of immediate occupancy 
9. The concurring opinion reads § 78-34-11 to 
fix the date of valuation at the time of service of 
summons only when the right to condemn is 
actually adjudicated, irrespective of whether val-
uation is also adjudicated. That construction 
strains the plain meaning of § 78-34-11 and 
on December 14, 1972. Based on that con-
clusion, the State asserts that the Fribergs 
thereafter remained on the property solely 
by the permission of the State. The State's 
theory seems to be that entitlement to con-
demn was established at that time. In 
addition, the State contends that the delay 
in this case is attributable solely to the 
Fribergs' own actions and that they should 
not be permitted to profit from a delay 
they themselves caused. 
A. Order of Immediate Occupancy 
[16,17] We turn first to the issue of the 
legal effect of the order of immediate occu-
pancy. In a condemnation proceeding, the 
State has the burden of coming forward 
with the evidence of, and the burden of 
persuasion to establish, its right to con-
demn. The State must prove that the tak-
ing of the property is necessary and that 
the property will be dedicated to a public 
use. Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & 
Irrigation Co,, 40 Utah 105, 118, 121 P. 
584, 589 (1911), affd, 239 U.S. 323, 36 S.Ct. 
101, 60 L.Ed. 307 (1915). See Williams v. 
Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., Utah, 602 
P.2d 684, 688 (1979); Monetaire Mining 
Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated 
Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 426, 174 P. 172, 
177 (1918). Cf. Salt Lake County v. Ra-
moselli, Utah, 567 P.2d 182, 184 (1977). 
Only after the State has established the 
elements of the cause of action, must the 
property owner prove the amount of com-
pensation to which he is entitled. State ex 
rel Road Commission v. Taggart, 19 Utah 
2d 247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967); Utah Road 
Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 
383 P.2d 917 (1963); Tanner v. Provo 
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., supra. 
The State argues that because the Fri-
bergs challenged the State's authority to 
condemn at the hearing on the motion for 
immediate occupancy, the doctrine of res 
judicata bars the Fribergs from again adju-
dicating the State's power to condemn. On 
would lead to the anomalous situation of requir-
ing different valuation dates depending on the 
extraneous factor of whether the right to con-
demn is contested. Neither the Fribergs nor the 
State has asserted that position. 
UTAH STATE ROAD COiM'N v. FRIBERG 
Cite as 687 P.2d 821 (Utah 1984) 
Utah 833 
that premise, the State concludes that its 
right to condemn was fixed when the order 
of immediate occupancy was entered and 
that valuation as of the date of service of 
process was fair and reasonable because 
there had been no undue delay between the 
time of service and the time the order of 
immediate occupancy was entered. The ar-
gument is based on language in Utah Cop-
per Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consolidat-
ed Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 437, 255 P. 
672, 677 (1926): 
Under [the predecessor to § 78-34-9] 
it is apparent that the power of the court 
to grant or refuse an application to occu-
py premises sought to be condemned, 
"pending the action/' is, to a large ex-
tent, discretionary, depending upon the 
showing of necessity for a speedy occu-
pation. To wisely exercise the discretion 
the court might well require the plaintiff 
to make a showing, not only as to the 
necessity for a speedy occupation, but 
also a prima facie showing as to his 
right to condemn, if that right be con-
troverted. [Emphasis added.] 
[18] The State misconstrues both the 
language of Utah Copper and the nature 
of a proceeding for immediate occupancy. 
The above-quoted language only states that 
if the condemnor's authority to condemn is 
challenged, a prima facie showing of the 
right to condemn must be made to support 
an order of immediate occupancy. How-
ever, a prima facie showing of authority is 
not a final determination of authority. 
Such a showing simply requires the State 
to adduce some evidence to prove that it 
has fulfilled the necessary preconditions to 
the exercise of the power of eminent do-
main, a procedure similar to the entry of a 
preliminary injunction. The law could 
hardly allow the State to expel a landowner 
from his land before a final judgment is 
entered without at least some proof of its 
power to do so. 
10. A defendant may be barred from litigating 
the merits of the State's authority after an order 
of immediate occupancy has been granted if he 
waives his right to litigate those issues or he 
[19] An order of immediate occupancy 
is entered pendente lite and only autho-
rizes the State to take immediate posses-
sion until a final adjudication of the merits. 
"[A]n order of immediate occupancy is 
nothing more than an interlocutory order/' 
State ex rel. Road Commission v. Daniel-
son, 122 Utah 220, 222, 247 P.2d 900, 901 
(1952); Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-
Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 69 
Utah 423, 436, 255 P. 672, 676 (1926). See 
also § 78-34-9 (which assumes that an or-
der of immediate occupancy is an interlocu-
tory order only). 
[20] In the instant case, the order of 
immediate occupancy, on its face, did not 
decide the jurisdictional conditions prece-
dent to a final judgment and decree. The 
order states: "It is further ordered and 
adjudged that pending further hearing 
and trial on the issues that may be 
presented in this action, and subject to 
the conditions herein set forth" the Fri-
bergs may not interfere with the State's 
possession of the premises (emphasis add-
ed). The trial court made no findings as to 
the State's authority to condemn. The or-
der clearly contemplated that the issues 
relating to the State's authority to con-
demn were to be decided in a "further 
hearing." 
[21-24] The State's right to condemn, if 
challenged, can finally be determined only 
after a trial on the merits, not at a hearing 
on the motion for immediate occupancy. 
State v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad 
Co., 8 Utah 2d 236, 238, 332 P.2d 926, 927 
(1958).10 Since an order of immediate occu-
pancy only requires prima facie proof of 
the right to condemn, that order is not a 
final adjudication on the merits. Res judi-
cata has no application in the absence of a 
final adjudication. Cf Pegues v. More-
house Parrish School Board, 706 F.2d 735 
(5th Cir.1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fen-
ner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391 
(5th Cir.1981). See generally IB J. Moore, 
withdraws the money deposited by the State in 
obtaining the order. § 78-34-9. Otherwise, the 
condemnor's power to condemn may be litigat-
ed in a plenary trial on the merits. 
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125] The Fribergs' express reservation 
of their right to contest the power to con-
demn in plenary proceedings is not prohib-
ited by the rules of res judicata. In fact, 
as late as December 12, 1979, the Fribergs 
and the State stipulated that the Fribergs 
would convey title and that only two issues 
would be reserved for an evidentiary trial: 
the amount of damages and the date of 
valuation. 
B. The Delay in Consummation 
of Proceeding 
The trial court found, and the State as-
serts on this appeal, that the sole blame for 
the delay in the consummation of the con-
demnation proceedings rests on the Fri-
bergs because they filed the first federal 
court action against the State, which result-
ed in an injunction against the State's pro-
ceeding with the 1-215 project, and because 
they financially supported the second fed-
eral action challenging the sufficiency of 
the E.I.S., which also resulted in an injunc-
tion. The State also contends that when 
undue delay occurs in a condemnation pro-
ceeding the only remedy is dismissal of the 
action. Notwithstanding that position, the 
State has successfully opposed two motions 
to dismiss the action for the State's failure 
to prosecute the case to a conclusion. 
The Fribergs, on the other hand, contend 
that the dominant reason for the long delay 
between the service of summons and the 
final acquisition of title by the State some 
seven and one-half years later was the 
State's failure to prosecute. Indeed, even 
apart from the lengthy delays occasioned 
by the two federal actions, the Fribergs 
assert, and there is some record evidence to 
support the assertion, that the State had 
not even settled on a final alignment of the 
highway until some time in 1979 or 1980. 
Interstate 215 is a partially federally-
funded project, and the State had to comply 
with the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA). One requirement of that Act 
is the preparation and filing of a study on 
the impact of a federally funded project on 
the environment. Although the State now 
suggests that it was not subject to NEPA, 
it nonetheless stipulated in the first federal 
court action that it was and would file an 
Environmental Impact Statement. The in-
junction issued in that case and in the 
subsequent case, which wras filed to test 
the adequacy of the State's E.I.S., had the 
effect of placing the whole project in limbo, 
including the legal proceedings against the 
Fribergs. 
[26] Preliminarily, we note that fault is 
not really the issue here. The law does not 
require landowners to meekly yield to the 
State's claim to condemn his or her land. 
Every landowner in this country has a 
right to resist with every legal means avail-
able the expropriation of his or her land. 
The right of eminent domain does not re-
quire docile passivity on the part of a land-
owner. Nor did the Fribergs engage in 
tactics that unjustifiably protracted this lit-
igation by demands for a series of continu-
ances. All they did was pursue an estab-
lished, well-recognized and well-founded le-
gal remedy to compel the State to comply 
with federal law. The Fribergs' neighbors 
then challenged the validity of the E.I.S. 
and the State's compliance with NEPA. 
Although the State may have had a good-
faith belief that it did not have to comply 
with NEPA, it nevertheless was stopped 
dead in its tracks by federal court injunc-
tions because it failed to comply with that 
law. That failure existed even before the 
State commenced action against the Fri-
bergs. 
[27, 28] Since the State has the burden 
of proving its right to exercise the power to 
condemn, Monetaire Mining Co. v. Colum-
bus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co., 53 
Utah 413, 174 P. 172 (1918); Tanner v. 
Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 
Utah 105, 121 P. 584 (1911), the State must 
be prepared to establish that it has com-
plied with all necessary conditions prece-
dent. The delay occasioned by the federal 
actions cannot justify penalizing the Fri-
bergs by denying them a part of the value 
of their property, which appreciated while 
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comply with NEPA,11 and it was basically expectation that the condemnation of their 
the federal court proceedings that delayed land might ultimately prove unnecessary, 
the condemnation action. 
[29,30] The contention that the Fribergs 
should lose the appreciated value of their 
property because of their participation in 
the federal action simply does not wash. 
The State, as a matter of constitutional 
law, cannot penalize the Fribergs' assertion 
of a federal right by requiring it to give up 
a state constitutional right. Cf. Lefkoivitz 
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 94 S.Ct. 316, 38 
L.Ed.2d 274 (1973); Spevack v. Klein, 385 
U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 
(1967); Terra! v. Burke Construction Co., 
257 U.S. 529, 42 S.Ct. 188, 66 L.Ed. 352 
(1922); Southern Pacific Co. v. Denton, 
146 U.S. 202, 13 S.Ct. 44, 36 L.Ed. 942 
(1892); Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186, 
7 S.Ct. 931, 30 L.Ed. 915 (1887); Doyle v. 
Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. (4 Ot-
to) 535, 24 L.Ed. 148 (1876); Insurance Co. 
v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 22 L.Ed. 
365 (1874). In sum, it would be a violation 
of the supremacy clause of the United 
States Constitution to penalize a landown-
er's right to "just compensation" because 
of the assertion of a federal right, and it 
would be wholly unreasonable and invidi-
ous to penalize the assertion of a state 
right because somebody else asserted a 
federal right, as would be the case if the 
Fribergs were penalized because of the sec-
ond federal lawsuit. 
In short, the Fribergs' right to just com-
pensation cannot be defeated because they 
wanted to retain their land as long as possi-
ble. There was, after all, the possibility 
that the alignment, which apparently was 
not finally established until years after the 
filing of the lawsuit, might have been 
changed, thereby avoiding the necessity of 
taking the Fribergs' land. Under those 
circumstances, especially when combined 
11. Although the State contends that it did not 
have to comply with NEPA, we do not need to 
address that issue. The State apparently did not 
really litigate that issue in the federal district 
court. Since the parties in those actions treated 
IV. VALUATION DATE 
[31] The instant case clearly calls for a 
departure from valuing the Fribergs' prop-
erty as of the date of service of process. 
The period from the service of summons to 
the establishment of the right to condemn 
has been far greater than would normally 
be required to prosecute a condemnation 
case to a conclusion. There has been a 
substantial increase in the value of the 
Fribergs' land during the lengthy period 
that the proceedings have been pending. 
Although the record does not disclose how 
much appreciation has occurred, we take 
judicial notice of the fact that land values 
in the Salt Lake Valley have increased sub-
stantially during the period in question be-
cause of general inflation in the economy 
and a great increase in the population, ac-
companied by an increase in demand for 
land in Salt Lake County. Those factors 
require the conclusion that the difference 
in the valuation of defendants' property 
between the date of service of summons 
and the date when the right to condemn 
was settled is evident and significant. Fur-
thermore, interest should be allowed on the 
award from the date of the Fribergs' aban-
donment of the property. City of South 
Ogden v. Fujiki, Utah, 621 P.2d 1254 
(1980). 
Reversed and remanded. Costs to appel-
lants. 
DURHAM, J., concurs. 
OAKS, Justice, (concurring): 
I concur in the reversal and remand and 
in Parts I and III of the Court's opinion, 
except for the references to constitutional 
NEPA as being applicable and injunctions were 
issued, that is a sufficient basis for determining 
that the delay caused by the litigation was not 
the Fribergs' fault. See footnote 3. 
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law in the last few paragraphs of Part 
IIIB. 
I join the Court in its conclusion and 
reasoning that in the circumstances of this 
case neither the 1972 stipulation (quoted in 
the dissent) nor the 1972 order of immedi-
ate occupancy deprived the Fribergs of 
their right to litigate whether the State had 
established the "conditions precedent to 
taking" specified in § 78-34-4. The Fri-
bergs did not "abandon" their right to liti-
gate this question because they did not 
withdraw the $80,000 that had been depos-
ited pursuant to the order of immediate 
occupancy. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-9. 
While I share the dissent's view that the 
best interests of all concerned dictate that 
the State's right to take by eminent domain 
be resolved as soon as possible, property 
owners who do not abandon their defenses 
in the manner specified in § 78-34-9 must 
have an opportunity to litigate them. Ei-
ther party can bring that issue on for deci-
sion, with or without a simultaneous deter-
mination of damages. Because that was 
not done in this case, the effect was to 
postpone the date for the determination of 
value, as explained below. 
On remand, the court should award Fri-
bergs compensation and damages on the 
basis of the value of their property on the 
date on which the State's right to condemn 
was finally established by court order on 
stipulation of the parties, December 12, 
1979. This result follows from the fact 
that the State's right to condemn the Fri-
berg property and the amount of compen-
sation and damages that had to be paid for 
it were never adjudicated in a contested 
proceeding. Section 78-34-11, which estab-
lishes the measure of compensation and 
damages as the "actual value" at the "date 
of the service of summons," only applies, 
by its terms, to "all cases where such dam-
ages are allowed, as provided in the next 
preceding section [78-34-10]." In the con-
text of § 78-34-11 and its cross-reference 
to § 78-34-10, the quoted reference to al-
lowance of "damages" seems to me to in-
clude both compensation and damages. 
Both subjects are treated in § 78-34-10, 
and both are referenced in the preamble to 
§ 78-34-11. 
Since the Fribergs' compensation was 
not "allowed" pursuant to the contested 
proceeding contemplated in § 78-34-10 (af-
ter adjudication of the right to condemn), 
the valuation date specified in § 78-34-11 
is inapplicable to them. In this circum-
stance, the property owners are entitled to 
a determination of value as of the date of 
taking and to interest on the unpaid bal-
ance of that amount from that date or from 
the date they relinquished possession, 
whichever is later. 
In this view of the case, the constitution-
al discussion in Part II of the plurality 
opinion is unnecessary. In my view, it also 
raises troublesome questions that should 
not be raised and need not be answered. 
The summons date that § 78-34-11 speci-
fies for valuation in adjudicated cases is a 
certain answer to a vital question. That 
certainty yields to confusion under Part II 
of the plurality opinion, which turns the 
statutory valuation date into a "rebuttable 
presumption" that "imports a degree of 
flexibility into the statutory valuation 
scheme." Under that reasoning, the ser-
vice-of-summons date could not constitu-
tionally be applied to measure compensa-
tion or damages where the condemnation 
proceeding was "prolonged" (elsewhere re-
ferred to as a "substantial interval" or 
"extraordinary delay") and where the value 
of the property had "substantially appreci-
ated" during the interval before the right 
to condemn was established "so that the 
valuation does not reflect a fair valuation 
of the property and does not therefore con-
stitute 'just compensation.' " The complex-
ities of administering a constitutional doc-
trine based on such generalities are evi-
dent. How much appreciation is "substan-
tial"? How much delay in adjudication is 
"extraordinary"? When does a proceeding 
become "prolonged"? And if these condi-
tions are satisfied, how much "flexibility" 
in a valuation date does the Constitution 
require? 
We should not impose the necessity of 
answering these questions in adjudicated 
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cases. If there is a point at which state 
delay in prosecuting a condemnation action 
would cause the summons date to be un-
constitutional as applied in a rapidly rising 
market, that issue can be settled in a fu-
ture case which presents it unavoidably. 
The recent amendment of § 78-34-4(3) (re-
quiring state use to commence within a 
reasonable time after the initiation of con-
demnation proceedings) makes it less likely 
that this issue will arise. In any event, it 
need not be resolved on the facts of this 
case. 
HALL, Chief Justice, dissenting: 
The dispositional issue presented by this 
appeal is simply one of fact, namely: 
whether the plaintiff unreasonably delayed 
the condemnation proceedings so as to prej-
udice the Fribergs' right to appropriate 
compensation and damages. The trial 
court resolved this issue in favor of plain-
tiff, and its decision is supported by sub-
stantial evidence that precludes this Court 
from substituting its judgment for that of 
the trial court.1 
The record plainly shows that plaintiff 
postponed final condemnation of the Fri-
bergs' property until 1979 as an accommo-
dation to the Fribergs, who, according to 
their counsel, "didn't want to surrender the 
property under any circumstances" and 
wished to "stay as long as they could [in 
the hope that] perhaps the highway would 
never be built." 
Following the Fribergs' 1972 stipulation 
to "immediate occupancy" by plaintiff, the 
Fribergs made several requests to Donald 
Coleman, counsel for plaintiff, for coopera-
tion by plaintiff in allowing them to remain 
on the property as long as possible. A 
letter written to Coleman on September 12, 
1973, by counsel for the Fribergs contained 
one such request: 
In all events, the Fribergs wish to re-
tain the use and occupancy of the proper-
ty for as long as possible and to that end, 
I will look to hearing from you 
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According to an affidavit by Coleman, he 
telephoned the Fribergs' counsel following 
receipt of the above letter and agreed that 
"as an accommodation to him [Coleman] 
would delay proceeding to displace the de-
fendants as long as he could." Coleman's 
affidavit further states: 
During the pendency of this action, 
there have been several verbal communi-
cations between Affiant and counsel for 
the defendants, and the request to delay 
proceeding against the defendants has 
been repeatedly made by defendants' at-
torney and Affiant has agreed to cooper-
ate to the extent possible to avoid dis-
placement of the defendants as long as 
possible. 
Affiant within the last month has re-
ceived a verbal request from defendants' 
counsel to delay proceedings to displace 
said defendants until next year. Affiant 
said while he could make no promises he 
would see what could be done. 
Considerable action has been under-
taken in this case since December, 1972, 
and the telephone conferences that have 
taken place during the pendency of this 
cause involved the discussion of issues 
important to this case, such as deferring 
displacement of defendants 
The plaintiff has been ready, willing 
and able to proceed with this cause of 
action and would have done so had it not 
been for the conduct of the defendants 
and their counsel. 
The Fribergs do not deny having made 
such requests to plaintiff. 
In addition to persuading plaintiff to 
postpone condemnation proceedings, the 
Fribergs themselves initiated federal litiga-
tion that prevented plaintiff from continu-
ing with its plans for the beltway. In 
Cottonwood Citizens Group v. Brinegar,2 
a suit brought by the Fribergs and other 
Cottonwood-area citizens, the citizens' 
group alleged violations by plaintiff of fed-
eral environmental protection laws and 
prayed for an order "enjoining defendants 
1. Kinkella v. Baugh, Utah, 660 P.2d 233 (1983). 2. No. C-225-73 (D.Utah Jan. 11, 1974). 
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from taking any action in connection with 
the Project including .. authorizing or 
permitting further or continued condemna-
tion" until the alleged violations had been 
corrected. In response, the federal district 
court in which that suit was pending issued 
an order requiring preparation of an envi-
ronmental impact statement on the project 
and suspending all related planning and 
engineering work by plaintiff except as 
necessitated by preparation of the impact 
statement itself. The order also prohibited 
construction work on the southeast qua-
drant and limited plaintiffs right to pur-
chase property. This order effectively pre-
vented plaintiff from proceeding with its 
plans for the beltway between January, 
1974, the date of its issuance, and April, 
1978, the date of final approval of the 
impact statement. 
In February, 1979, following final ap-
proval of the impact statement, Cotton-
wood, Inc., a group to which the Fribergs 
had contributed financially, filed a second 
federal suit challenging the adequacy of 
the impact statement.3 Without waiting 
for resolution of the further issues raised 
by this second suit, plaintiff served the 
Fribergs with a notice to vacate in June, 
1979. The Fribergs continued to resist re-
linquishing their property, asserting in an 
"Objection to [Notice to] Vacate Premises": 
Until [the Cottonwood, Inc.,] case has 
been resolved and until it is patently 
clear that the said highway project will 
proceed on a defined schedule in the im-
mediate future, the property of these 
Defendants should not be taken or con-
demned. 
Less than three months later, the Fri-
bergs filed a motion to dismiss the condem-
nation complaint for failure to prosecute, 
relying on grounds similar to those argued 
in support of the present motion. In deny-
ing that motion, the trial court found as 
follows: 
Although this action has been pending 
some seven years, a good portion of the 
delay can be placed upon the direct or 
indirect conduct of the defendants. 
They have either directly or indirectly 
filed one or two actions in federal court 
seeking the delay or cancellation of this 
project. To now seek dismissal of this 
case for nonprosecution would be ineq-
uitable. [Emphasis added.] 
It is clear that the Fribergs made every 
effort to procrastinate the date of condem-
nation as long as possible and that they 
would not have welcomed an earlier con-
demnation date even though this might 
have enabled them to acquire other proper-
ty at a time when prices were lower. 
Counsel for the Fribergs stated in this re-
gard: 
[T]he Fribergs didn't want to surrender 
the property under any circumstanc-
es [M]oney wasn't the question. At 
this point the question was could they 
stay on the property. 
It is true that the Fribergs should not be 
penalized for having exercised their right 
to litigate issues relating to the legality of 
the beltway project and to plaintiff's right 
to condemn. However, the Fribergs' right 
to exercise all legal means of prolonging 
the condemnation process did not include 
the right to profit from the resulting delay 
by claiming for themselves, in contraven-
tion of their stipulation and the well-estab-
lished statutory valuation date, apprecia-
tion on the subject property caused by such 
delay. Valuation of the Fribergs' property 
as of the date of summons would not penal-
ize them, nor would it deprive them of any 
benefit that they would have obtained if 
they had not exercised this right. 
Moreover, the stipulation executed by 
the parties in 1972 that authorized the 
court to enter its order of immediate occu-
pancy sets forth terms of compensation 
that are wholly inconsistent with a 1979 
valuation date. The stipulation reads in 
toto as follows: 
1. Plaintiff shall deposit with the 
Clerk of the Court the sum of $80,000, 
which shall be paid by the Clerk to the 
defendants forthwith by delivering to 
counsel of record for defendants the 
3. Cottonwood, Inc. v. Hurley, No. C-79-0081 (D.Utah Nov. 29, 1979). 
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check or warrant of plaintiff in the sum 
of $80,000. 
2. Defendants shall be entitled to re-
main in possession of the premises rent 
free until September 1, 1973 and for peri-
ods thereafter on a month by month ba-
sis. Defendants shall be entitled to 30 
day advance notice before being required 
to vacate the premises. 
3. Interest on any amount recovered 
by defendants in addition to the $80,000 
above mentioned will not begin to accrue 
until defendants have vacated the prem-
ises. Interest from said point in time 
shall be at the rate provided by Section 
78-34-9 Utah Code Annotated as amend-
ed. 
The foregoing stipulation afforded the 
Fribergs two substantial monetary advan-
tages, one of which is required by statute,4 
but the second of which is neither contem-
plated nor required by statute.5 First, 
their agreement that the sum of $80,000 be 
paid forthwith placed the Fribergs in a 
position to immediately invest those funds 
as they saw fit. The fact that they subse-
quently chose not to accept the funds and 
thus voluntarily deprived themselves of 
that advantage is of no consequence in the 
resolution of this appeal. Second, the stip-
ulation permitted the Fribergs to remain in 
possession of the property rent-free. They 
have since enjoyed some eight years of 
rent-free occupancy, which adequately com-
pensates them according to their stipulated 
bargain with plaintiff. As a rule of thumb, 
monthly rental value is deemed to be a sum 
equal to one percent of market value. 
Even assuming that the $80,000 figure paid 
over by plaintiff represented full market 
value rather than only 75 percent thereof, 
as required by statute, infra, the monthly 
rental value was $800, or $9,600 per an-
num, and the Fribergs, over the eight-year 
period, have had the advantage of rent-free 
occupancy valued at $76,800. It is there-
4. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-9. 
5. Id. 
6. Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consoli-
dated Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 255 P. 672 
(1926). 
fore clearly unjust to allow the Fribergs, 
by setting their own valuation date, to re-
ceive appreciation in addition to the sub-
stantial benefits already received under 
their agreement. 
U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-4 provides that be-
fore property can be taken it must appear 
that the use to which it is to be applied is a 
use authorized by law and that the taking 
is necessary to such use. Section 78-34-9 
empowers the court to grant immediate 
occupancy of the premises pending final 
determination of the condemnation proceed-
ing. The power is largely discretionary, 
and in the exercise of its discretion, the 
court may well require a showing that the 
proposed use is authorized by law and that 
the taking is necessary for the contemplat-
ed use if those issues are in dispute.6 
The court is obliged to take proof of the 
value of the premises sought to be con-
demned, the damages that will accrue from 
the condemnation and the reasons for re-
quiring speedy occupation and shall grant 
or refuse immediate occupation according 
to the equity of the case and the relative 
damages that may accrue to the parties.7 
As a condition precedent to occupancy, 
the condemnor must deposit with the clerk 
of the court a sum equal to at least 75 
percent of the condemnor's appraised value 
of the property, and payment thereof to the 
condemnee shall be held to be an abandon-
ment of all defenses except the claim for 
greater compensation.8 In this case, the 
Fribergs agreed that payment of $80,000 
would be made forthwith. 
The tenor and effect of the stipulation of 
the parties was to relieve the plaintiff of 
the need to present proof that the condi-
tions precedent to a taking as provided by 
§§ 78-34-4 and 78-34-9 had been met. 
This is to be seen in that the plain language 
of the stipulation reflects the agreement of 
7. U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-9, supra. 
8. Id. 
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the parties that plaintiff was entitled to 
immediate occupancy. Furthermore, the 
stipulation does not recite the existence of 
a controversy as to the authority to take or 
the necessity of the taking, and of course it 
does not preserve any such issues for a 
future determination. In the exercise of 
its discretion, the court accepted the stipu-
lation and entered its order of occupancy 
without the necessity of a hearing and the 
taking of evidence, and for all intents and 
purposes the taking was then complete. 
All that remained was a determination of 
damages and the entry of judgment.9 
The fact that the stipulation preserved 
only the issue of damages for trial is not 
surprising. On the contrary, it is wholly 
consistent with the usual course of events 
in condemnation proceedings. Whenever 
issues pertaining to authority to condemn 
or necessity of the taking exist at the time 
an order of immediate occupancy is sought, 
the best interests of all concerned, includ-
ing those of the court, dictate that those 
issues be resolved prior to the issuance of 
the order of occupancy. Otherwise, the 
condemnor runs the unnecessary risk of 
defeat and the resultant loss of sums ex-
pended in preparing the property for its 
new use. Similarly, the condemnee runs 
the risk of irreparable harm to the property 
if the condemnor is permitted to occupy 
and alter the property to accommodate the 
new use. 
The particular facts of this case graphi-
cally illustrate the foregoing discussion. 
Plaintiffs designated use of the property 
entailed the construction of a remaining 
segment of the belt-route highway system 
in Salt Lake County. In light of the magni-
tude of such a project and the drastic 
change it would make in the topography, it 
seems beyond comprehension that the par-
ties would agree to an order of immediate 
occupancy if in fact legitimate issues of 
authority or necessity of the taking re-
mained to be resolved. 
The main opinion concedes that it is im-
possible to formulate a guideline for when 
the courts should depart from the statutory 
date of service of summons for the purpose 
of assessing compensation and damages.10 
Therein lies the fallacy in considering a 
departure therefrom at all. To do so in-
vites controversy in every case and affords 
a means for the parties to manipulate the 
measure of compensation that has hereto-
fore been prevented by adherence to the 
statutory provision. 
I remain unpersuaded that the facts of 
this case should prompt this Court to de-
part from the explicit language of U.C.A., 
1953, § 78-34-11, which establishes the val-
uation date as of the date of service of 
summons. 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
HOWE, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of HALL, C.J. 
J^\ . 
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9. As provided by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-15. 10. Provided for by U.C.A., 1953, § 78-34-11. 
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ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, Trustee 
of the MAX KERR TRUST Dated November 
26, 1996, and Interveners TOD B. JONES 
and PAUL E. BARKER, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 970700354 CD 
Judge Thomas L. Kay 
On February 14, 2000, at 1:30 p.m. the Court held a hearing to consider the parties* 
Motions in Limine and to conduct a Pre-Trial Conference. Gerald E. Hess, Esq. appeared on 
behalf of Davis County, George K. Fadel, Esq. appeared on behalf of Zions First National Bank, 
trustee of the Max Kerr Trust, and David R. Olsen, Esq., Alan W. Mortensen, Esq. and Douglas 
^ 3 09 ftf
 W 
H. Patton, Esq. appeared on behalf of Interveners Tod B. Jones and Paul E. Barker. Having 
considered the moving papers and having heard oral argument, the court ruled as follows: 
Motions in Limine 
1. Plaintiffs motion to exclude evidence of assessed valuation of the property for tax 
purposes is granted. 
2. Interveners' motion to allow evidence of comparable values of adjacent properties 
is granted. 
3. Plaintiffs motion to exclude evidence of assemblage adjacent to the subject 
property is vacated as moot by agreement of the parties. 
4. Plaintiffs motion to exclude evidence that Mr. Prows is the ultimate source of 
funding to pay for the judgment in this matter is denied. 
5. Interveners' motion to exclude plaintiffs multiple and cumulative expert witnesses 
is denied. 
6. Interveners' motion to exclude the opinion of Mr Throndsen is deferred. 
7. A ruling on interveners' motion to allow evidence of efforts to reduce the value of 
the condemned property is deferred. 
8. The Court advised the parties that they may proceed at their own risk in 
referencing documents and deposition testimony in their opening statements that may be excluded 
from evidence at trial. 
2 
Pre-Trial Conference 
The Court then turned its attention to various pre-trial matters and ruled as follows: 
1. On February 29, 2000, the parties shall submit requested jury instructions in the 
form of two copies (one containing citations and one blank). 
2. On February 29, 2000, the parties shall submit proposed jury questionnaires, if 
any. 
3. On February 29, 2000, the parties shall exchange a list of exhibits they intend to 
use at trial as well as a list of witnesses that they will and may call at trial. 
4. The parties are instructed to appear on March 6, 2000, at 8:00 a.m. for jury 
selection. Thereafter the court will normally conduct the trial between the hours of 8:30 a.m. to 
12:00 noon and 1:00 p.m. to 5.00 p.m. 
5. The parties have invoked the exclusionary rule, and therefore all witnesses except 
for party representatives and experts shall be precluded from hearing testimony during trial. 
6. Davis County and defendant and interveners together, shall each be limited to four 
peremptory challenges per side, i.e., four peremptory challenges for Davis County, and four total 
peremptory challenges for Defendants and Interveners. 
7. Finally, the Court advised the parties that jurors will be permitted, at the close of a 
witness's examination, to write questions and present them to the Court. The Court, in 
conference with counsel for the parties, will determine whether such questions shall be put to a 
particular witness. 
3 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
CONCLUSION 
There being no other matter addressed or considered, the court hereby enters the 
foregoing Order. 
2000. DATED this 2 5 f t l day of f ^ f a a t t * ^ . 
BY THE COURT 
The Honorable Thordas iL Kay 
Approved as to form: 
7" y 
G e r a l d ^ Hess 
Attorney for Davis County 
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